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Disowning	  Fukushima:	  
Managing	  the	  Credibility	  of	  Nuclear	  Reliability	  Assessment	  In	  
The	  Wake	  Of	  Disaster.	  	  	  
<Forthcoming	  in	  Regula'on	  &	  Governance	  (2013)>
John	  Downer	  1
Abstract:
This	  paper	   reﬂects	  on	  the	  credibility	  of	  nuclear	   risk	  assessment	  in	   the	  wake	  of	  2011	  Fukushima	  meltdowns.	  
In	  democraIc	  states,	  policymaking	  around	  nuclear	  energy	  has	  long	  been	  premised	  on	  an	  understanding	  that	  
experts	  can	  objecIvely	  and	  accurately	  calculate	  the	  probability	  of	  catastrophic	  accidents.	  Yet	  the	  Fukushima	  
disaster	   lends	  credence	  to	  the	  substanIal	  body	  of	  social	  science	  research	  that	  suggests	  such	  calculaIons	  are	  
fundamentally 	  unworkable.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  credibility	  of	  these	  assessments	  appears	  to	  have	  survived	  the	  
disaster,	  just	  as	  it	  has	  resisted	  the	  evidence	  of	  previous	  nuclear	  accidents.	  This	  paper	   looks	  at	  why.	  It	  argues	  
that	   public	   narraIves	   of	   the	   Fukushima	  disaster	   invariably	   frame	   it	   in	   ways	   that	   allow	   risk-­‐assessment	  
experts	   to	   ‘disown’	   it.	   It	   concludes	   that	   although	   these	   narraIves	   are	   both	   rhetorically	   compelling	   and	  
highly	  consequenIal	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  they	  are	  not	  enIrely	  credible.	  	  
Eight	  years	  involved	  with	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  have	  taught	  me	  that	  when	  nothing	  can	  possibly	  go	  wrong	  and	  every	  avenue	  has	  




Nuclear	   accidents	   and	   their	   aSendant	   dramas	   –	   evacuaIons,	   denials,	   health	   alerts,	   heroics	   –	   make	  
compelling	   news	  coverage,	   and	   so	   in	   March	   2011,	   when	   a	   giant	   earthquake	   oﬀ	   the	   coast	   of	   Japan	  
insIgated	   a	  series	  of	   reactor	  failures	  at	  the	  Fukushima	  Diiachi	  nuclear	  plant,	   the	  world’s	  media	  were	  
transﬁxed.	  The	  world	  watched	  avidly	  as	  the	  accident	  quickly	  escalated	  in	  severity,	  one	  increment	  of	  the	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‘InternaIonal	   Nuclear	   Event	   Scale’	   at	   a	   Ime,	   unIl	   ‘Fukushima’	   reached	   taxonomic	   parity	   with	  
‘Chernobyl’	  as	  a	  new	  synonym	  for	  technological	  disaster.	  
Amid	   the	  discourse	  of	   disaster,	   it	  was	   tempIng	   to	   reﬂect	   on	   the	  hundreds	  of	   other	   nuclear	   plants	  
around	   the	  world.	   And	  when	  BriIsh	   and	   French	   oﬃcials	  started	  advising	   their	  naIonals	   to	   evacuate	  
Tokyo	   (advice,	   it	  would	   later	  emerge,	   the	   Japanese	  government	  was	   itself	   considering	   at	  the	  highest	  
levels	  [Quintana	  2012;	  Fackler	  2011]),	  it	  was	  easy	  to	  wonder	  if	   the	  people	  of	  London,	  Paris	  or	  New	  York	  
might	  one	  day	  ﬁnd	  themselves	  hurrying	  bleary-­‐eyed	  children	  into	  cars	  and	  ﬁling	  into	  tense	  traﬃc	  jams,	  
uncertain	  if	  they	  would	  ever	  see	  their	  homes	  again.	  
Nuclear	  authoriIes	  –	   the	   IAEA;	  regulatory	  agencies;	  naIonal	  governments	  –	   and	   their	  experts	  quickly	  
moved	   to	   assuage	   such	   fears,	   each	  explaining,	   in	   varying	   ways,	  why	   the	  disaster	   in	  Japan	   should	  not	  
undermine	  the	  credibility	  of	   the	  nuclear	  industry	  in	  general.	  Given	  that	  the	  same	  authoriIes	  had	  been	  
promising	   for	   decades 	  that	   Japanese	   reactors 	  were	   safe,	   however,	   the	   accident	   posed	   an	   important	  
quesIon:	  how	  can	  the	  assurances	  of	  nuclear	  experts	  remain	  credible	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Fukushima?
This 	  is 	  the	  quesIon	   that	  moIvates 	  this	  paper.	   The	  answer,	   it	  will 	  suggest,	   lies	  in	   the	   fact	   that	   both	  
technical	  and	  popular	  accounts	  of	   the	  disaster	  rouInely	   frame	  it	   in	  ways	  that	  allow	  nuclear	  experts	  to	  
‘disown’	   it;	   thereby	   protecIng	   their	   authority,	   the	   legiImacy	   of	   their	   work,	   and	  more	   broadly,	   the	  
viability	  of	  an	  ideal	  on	  which	  both	  depend.	  Rather	  than	  try	  to	  provide	  another	  account	  of	  the	  accident,3	  
in	  other	  words,	  this	  paper	  will	  look	  criIcally	  at	  the	  accounts	  themselves:	  their	  rhetoric,	  their	  reasoning,	  
and	  their	  relaIonship	  to	  wider	  narraIves	  around	  the	  governance	  of	  criIcal	  infrastructures.	  
A	  Failure	  of	  Foresight	  
The	  ﬁrst	  thing	  to	  note	  about	  the	  Fukushima	  disaster	  (henceforth	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘Fukushima’)	   is	  that	  was	  
unexpected.	  And	  not	  just	  in	  a 	  speciﬁc	  sense	  –	  nobody	  ever	  expects	  a	  speciﬁc	  nuclear	  plant	  to	  melt	  down	  
on	  any	  given	  day	  –	  but	  in	  the	  much	  more	  foundaIonal	  sense	  that	  nobody	  expects	  any	  nuclear	  plants	  to	  
melt	  down.	  
To	   understand	   this	  disIncIon	   consider	   the	   realm	  of	   civil	   aviaIon.	   In	   this	   realm	  we	  understand	  that	  
airplanes	  very	  occasionally,	  but	  nevertheless	  rou'nely,	  crash,	  even	  though	  any	  speciﬁc	  crash	  is	  always	  
unexpected.	  We	  accept	  such	  accidents	  as	  an	  inevitable	  cost	  of	  the	  technology	  and	  we	  anIcipate	  them	  in	  
our	  plans	  and	  insItuIons.	  The	  same	  logic	  does	  not	  hold	  in	  the	  nuclear	  sphere,	  however.	  Reactors,	  in	  this	  
respect,	  are	  more	  comparable	  to	  dams	  or	  bridges,	  in	  that	  public	  decisions	  about	  them	  are	  predicated	  on	  
an	  understanding	  that	  the	  chance	  of	  them	  failing	  catastrophically	  is	  so	  low	  as	  to	  be	  negligible.	  Modern	  
democracies,	  we	  might	  say,	  are	  insItuIonally	  blind	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  nuclear	  meltdowns.
This 	  blindness 	  was	  evinced	  by	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  Japan	  seemed	  under-­‐prepared	  for	   the	  disaster.	  At	  
the	   plant	   itself,	   for	   instance,	   procedures	   and	   guidelines	  were	   woefully	   insuﬃcient	   for	   a 	  meltdown,	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forcing	  operators	  to	  respond	  on	  an	  almost	  enIrely	  ad	  hoc	  basis.	  When	  the	  lights	  went	  out	  they	  had	  to	  
borrow	  ﬂashlights	  from	  nearby	  homes 	  to	  study	  the	  plant’s	  gauges	  (Osnos	  2011:	  50).	  On-­‐site	  dosimeters	  
maxed-­‐out	  at	  levels	  that	  were	  far	   below	  those	  that	  could	  be	  expected	  from	   a	  catastrophe,	  unable	  to	  
display	   readings 	  any	   higher.	  And,	  as	  the	  plant’s	  former	   safety	  manager	  would	  later	  tesIfy,	  emergency	  
plans	  “...had	  no	  menIon	  of	  using	  sea-­‐water	  to	  cool	  the	  core”	  (quoted	  in	  Adelstein	  &	  McNeill	  2011),	  an	  
oversight	  that	  caused	  unnecessary,	  and	  perhaps 	  criIcal,	  delays.	  The	  bureaucraIc	  infrastructure	  beyond	  
the	   plant	   evinced	   similar	   shortcomings.	   Oﬃcial	   announcements	   were	   onen	   ill-­‐considered	   and	  
characterized	   by	   denial,	   secrecy,	   and	   refusal	   to	   accept	   outside	   help	   (Perrow	   2011b:	   50).	   Important	  
medicaIons	   were	   scarce,	   with	   byzanIne	   rules 	   hindering	   their	   eﬀecIve	   distribuIon	   (Kubiak	   2011).	  
EvacuaIons	  were	  poorly	  managed,	  with	  vital	   informaIon	  being	   withheld	   in	  ways	  that	   exposed	  many	  
families	  to	  unnecessary	  danger	  (Onishi	  &	  Fackler	  2011).4	  
We	  should	  be	  wary,	  moreover,	  of	   seeing	   such	  failures	  of	   foresight	  as	  a 	  speciﬁcally	   Japanese	  problem.	  
Very	  few	  observers	  suggest	  that	  other	  naIons	  are	  substanIally	  beSer	  prepared	  for	  such	  a	  conIngency	  
(see,	  eg:	  Perrow	  2011b:	  46-­‐7;	  Kahn	  2011).	  As	  Perrow	  (2007)	  and	  others	  compellingly	  argue,	  all	  socieIes	  
rouInely	   make	   choices	   about	   nuclear	   power	   that	   seem	   myopic	   when	   considered	   in	   relaIon	   to	   a	  
potenIal	  disaster.	  A	  conspicuous	  example	  being	  the	  rouIne	  ‘clustering’	  of	   several	  nuclear	  reactors	  in	  a	  
single	   facility,	   a	   choice	  that	   oﬀers	   signiﬁcant	   economic	   and	   poliIcal	   beneﬁts	   but	   creates 	  condiIons	  
where	  the	  failure	  of	   one	  unit	   can	  propagate	  to	  others	  (Perrow	  2007:	   136).	   (The	  Fukushima	  plant,	   for	  
instance,	  was	  a	  cluster	  of	  six	  reactors	  –	  something	  that	  workers	  must	  have	  rued	  as	  the	  fallout	  from	  the	  
ﬁrst	  explosion	  created	  a	  deadly	  radioacIve	  hot-­‐zone	  around	   its	  neighbors,	  ulImately	   thwarIng	  eﬀorts	  
to	  contain	  the	  disaster	  [Osnos	  2011:	  50;	  Strickland	  2011]).
This 	  is	  not	   to	  say	   that	  disaster	  planning	   is	  enIrely	   absent	   in	   the	  nuclear	   sphere,	  but	   rather	  that	   it	   is	  
rouInely	   insincere	   and	   insuﬃcient.	   Clarke	   and	   Perrow	   (1996),	   for	   instance,	   describe	   some	   of	   the	  
evacuaIon	  planning	  undertaken	  for	  Shoreham	  Nuclear	  Power	  StaIon	  on	  Long	  Island,	  but	  argue	  that	  the	  
assumpIons	  of	   these	  plans	  were	  so	  unrealisIc	  that	  they	  are	  more	  properly	  understood	  not	  as 	  earnest	  
conIngency	   preparaIon	   but	   as 	   elaborate	   public	   performances	   –	   bureaucraIc	   Kabuki.5 	   When	  
organizaIons	  do	   aSempt	   to	   think	  more	   earnestly	   about	   nuclear	   disaster,	  meanwhile,	   the	  plans 	  they	  
produce	  rouInely	   lack	   any	   insItuIonal	   authority.	   The	  US	   Nuclear	  Regulatory	   Commission	   (NRC),	   for	  
instance,	   developed	   “Severe	   Accident	   Management	   Guidelines”	   (SAMGs)	   for	   direcIng	   reactor	  
operaIons	  in	  the	  event	  of	  “unanIcipated	  accident	  sequences”	  (ie:	  events	  like	  Fukushima),	  but	  training	  
in	   these	   guidelines	  was	   voluntary.	  At	   the	  Ime	  of	   the	   crisis	   the	   NRC	   did	   not	   require	   that	   operators	  
demonstrate	  any	  knowledge	  of	  the	  SAMGs	  or	  their	  applicaIon	  (Lochbaum	  2011),	  and	  a	  recent	  audit	  of	  
US	  plants	  has	  found	  them	  to	  have	  been	  largely	  neglected	  (NRC	  2011).
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InformaIon,’	  for	  instance,	  meant	  that	  many	  evacuees	  spent	  several	  days	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5	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	  plans	  for	  nuclear	  meltdowns	  echo	  those	  for	  nuclear	  wars	  (eg:	  Eden	  2004;	  Clarke	  1999).
Nuclear	  Probabilism
This 	  lack	  of	  preparedness	  for	  nuclear	  disasters	  is	  puzzling,	  given	  that	  with	  the	  recent	  turn	  to	  ‘resilience’	  
in	  policymaking.	  Western	   states	  now	   invest	   heavily	   in	   planning	   and	   preparing	   for	   disasters 	   in	  many	  
spheres	  –	   in	   respect	   to	  ﬂooding	  and	  terrorism,	   for	   instance	   (eg:	  Walker	  &	  Cooper	  2011;	  Collier	  2008;	  
Duﬃeld	  2011).	  So	  why	  the	  neglect	  in	  the	  nuclear	  sphere?
The	  answer	   lies	  in	  an	   insItuIonally	  deep-­‐rooted	  conﬁdence	  that	  conIngency	  planning	   is	  unnecessary	  
for	  nuclear	  disasters.	   For,	   as	  Beck	   (1999:	  150)	   puts 	  it,	  “our	   risk	  assessment	  bureaucracies	  have	  found	  
ways	   to	   deny	   systemic	   hazards”.	   Policymakers	   treat	   the	   risks	   of	   nuclear	   meltdowns	   as	   if	   they	   are	  
objec'vely	  calculable	   in	  way	  that	  the	  risks	  of	   terrorism	  are	  not,	  and	  en'rely	  preventable	   in	  a	  way	  that	  
ﬂoods	  are	  not.	  Thus	  they	   defer	   to	   expert	   assurances	  that	  nuclear	   accidents,	  unlike	  ﬂoods	  and	  acts	  of	  
terror,	  will	  not	  happen,	  and	  so	  need	  not	  be	  prepared	  for.
Various	  scholars	  have	  noted	  this	  insItuIonal	  disavowal	  of	  nuclear	  disaster	  (eg:	  Rip	  1986;	  Clarke	  2005),	  
noIng	   that	   it	   emerged	   in	   the	  1960s	  and	   1970s	  as 	  a	   response	   to	  speciﬁc	   poliIcal	   conIngencies.	   For	  
reasons	  relaIng	   to	   the	  Cold	  War	  and	  nuclear	  weapons,	  they	  argue,	  the	  West	  (parIcularly	  the	  US)	  was	  
commiSed	  to	  nuclear	  power	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  (Kuznick	  2011).	  Yet	  oﬃcial	  nuclear	  regulatory	  studies	  
were	   threatening	   the	   poliIcal	   viability	   of	   this 	   commitment	   by	   projecIng	   that	   the	   potenIal	  
consequences	  of	   an	  accident	  could	  be	  severe.	   To	   circumvent	   this 	  problem,	  scholars	  argue,	   regulatory	  
agencies	  such	   as	  the	  US	   NRC	   (then	   the	  Atomic	  Energy	   Commission)	   shined	  the	  focus	  of	   their	   studies	  
away	   from	  assessments 	  of	   the	  consequences	   of	  a 	  disaster	  (their	  primary	  focus	  unIl	  then)	  and	  towards	  
assessments	   of	   likelihood.	   Rather	   than	   jusIfying	   nuclear	   power	   by	   exploring	   the	   implicaIons	   of	  
accidents,	  in	  other	  words,	  authoriIes	  sought	  to	  draw	  a	  disIncIon	  between	  "credible"	  accidents,	  which	  
were	  worthy	   of	   poliIcal	   concern,	   and	   "hypotheIcal"	   accidents,	   which	  were	   not	   (Rip	   1986	   4-­‐9;	   also	  
Clarke	  2005).6	  A	  posiIon	  that	  was	  neatly	  illustrated	  by	  a	  former	  Safety	  Director	  of	  BriIsh	  Nuclear	  Fuels	  
Limited,	  when	  he	  declared	  that:	  “once	  an	  accident	  becomes	  inconceivable,	  as	  far	  as 	  I	  am	  concerned	  it	  is	  
impossible”	  (in	  Donoghue	  1977:	  14-­‐15).
At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  transiIon	  was	  a	  turn	  to	  probabilisIc	  reliability	  analysis:	  the	  creaIon	  and	  adopIon	  of	  
a	   series	   of	   calculaIve	   audit	   tools	   that	   oﬀered	   regulators	   a	  means	   of	   ‘objecIvely’	   establishing	   that	  
nuclear	   accidents	  were	   too	   improbable	  to	  merit	   serious	   discussion	   (Rip	   1986:	   7-­‐9;	   also:	   Fuller	  1976:	  
149-­‐186).	  The	  NRC’s 	  1975	  “WASH-­‐1400”	  study	  of	  reactor	  safety	  is	  usually	  regarded	  as 	  the	  key	  document	  
in	  this 	  revoluIon.	  The	  study,	  which	  leant	  heavily	  on	  the	  1967	  ‘Rasmussen	  report’	  on	  reactor	  accidents,	  
was	  hailed	   as	  “a	   landmark	   achievement	   in	  risk	   analysis”	   (Rip	  1986:	   7).	   Like	  the	  Rasmussen	  report,	   it	  
arrived	  at	  its	  accident	  probabiliIes	  by	  using	  models	  that	  combined	  the	  failure	  data	  of	   generic	  reactor	  
parts	  and	  sub-­‐systems	  to	  mathemaIcally	  derive	  the	  failure	  probability	  of	  the	  wider	  system	  (Rip	  1986:	  8).	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6	  As	  Sagan	  (2004:	  944)	  has	  observed	  in	  relaIon	  to	  nuclear	  weapons	  “organizaIons	  can	  [marginalize]	  low-­‐probability	  events	  by	  transforming	  
them	  into	  assumpIons	  of	  impossibility.”
Signiﬁcant	  elements	  of	   the	  scienIﬁc	  and	  engineering	   community	  were	  deeply	  skepIcal	  of	   this	  turn	  to	  
probabilism,	   criIcizing	   both	   the	   Rasmussen	   report	   and	   the	   WASH	   study	   that	   built	   on	   it.	   A	   1977	  
Congressional	   review	   panel	   of	   safety	   experts,	   for	   instance,	   “…criIcized	   [the	   Rasmussen	   report’s]	  
inadequate	  data	  base	  and	  quesIonable	  methodological	  and	  staIsIcal	  procedures…”	  arguing	  that	  they	  
“…led	  to	  uncertainty	  bands	  which	  greatly	  understated	  the	  actual	  uncertainty”	  (Rip	  1986:	  8).	  Brookhaven	  
NaIonal	  Laboratory,	  which	  had	  overseen	  previous 	  WASH	  studies	  and	  had	  been	  the	  preferred	  contractor	  
for	  WASH-­‐1400,	  took	  a	  similar	  line.	  It	  rejected	  the	  Rasmussen	  study’s	  probabilisIc	  approach	  to	  reactor	  
assessments,	   arguing	   that	   “…it	   would	   be	   ‘charlatanism’	   to	   make	   predicIons	   about	   probability,	  
and	   that	   only	   ‘fringe	   members	   of	   the	   staIsIcal	   community’	   would	   aSempt	   to	   do	   this	   with	   the	  
meagre	  data	  available”	  (Rip	  1986:	  7;	  see	  also:	  Fuller	  1976:	  141-­‐8).	  
Brookhaven’s	  recalcitrance	  on	  this	  issue	  eventually	  led	  it	  be	  replaced	  as	  contractor	  for	  WASH-­‐1400,	  but	  
doubts	  remained.	  In	  1978,	  the	  NRC	  sponsored	  an	  ad	  hoc	  ‘Risk	  Assessment	  Review	  Group’	  (RARG),	  which	  
found	  in	  its 	  report	  that	  the	  new	  safety	  studies	  were	  failing	  to	  “…suﬃciently	  emphasize	  the	  uncertainIes	  
involved”	   in	   their	   ﬁndings,	   with	   the	  eﬀect	   that	   probabilisIc	   assessment	   was	   being	   “...misused	   as	  a	  
vehicle	  to	  judge	  the	  acceptability	  of	  reactor	  risks”	  (RARG	  1978:	  ix-­‐x).	  The	  same	  year,	  a	  member	  of	   the	  
NRC	  ‘Advisory	  CommiSee	  on	  Reactor	  Safety’	  echoed	  this	  view,	  wriIng	  of	  WASH-­‐1400	  that	  “…although	  
the	   job	   was	   done	   in	   a	  workman-­‐like	  way,	   many	   of	   the	   underlying	   facts,	   which	   must	   be	   known	   to	  
accurately	   predict	   the	   course	   of	   an	   accident,	   are	   lacking…”	  with	   the	   eﬀect	   that	   “…the	  quanItaIve	  
esImates	   of	   the	   probability	   of	   the	   various	   accident	   chains	   must	   be	   viewed	   with	   some	  
reservaIons”	  (Okrent	  1978:	  17).	  Under	  pressure	  from	  such	  reports,	  even	  the	  NRC	  distanced	  itself	  from	  
WASH-­‐1400,	   conceding,	   according	   to	   Rip	   (1986:	   8),	   that	   the	   report	   “did	   not	   regard	   the	   numerical	  
esImate	  of	  the	  overall	  risk	  of	  reactor	  accident	  reliable.”	  
For	  all	  the	  recogniIon	  of	  WASH-­‐1400’s	  imperfecIons,	  however,	  its 	  probabilisIc	  approach	  to	  risk	  became	  
entrenched	  in	  the	  mechanics	  of	  nuclear	  regulaIon	  (Rip	  1986:	  8).	  Subsequent	  NRC	  safety	  analyses,	  such	  
as	   CRAC-­‐II	   and	   NUREG-­‐1150,	   updated	  WASH-­‐1400’s	   analyIcal	   models,	   but	   all	   adhered	   to	   the	   same	  
underlying	   premise	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  accidents 	  was	  a	  fundamentally	  calculable	  property.	  (And	  all	  
similarly	  determined	  that	  serious	  accidents	  were	  incredibly	  unlikely).	  
Today,	  probabilism	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  nuclear	  regulatory	  oversight,	  with	  almost	  every	  decision	  being	  
driven	   by	   ProbabilisIc	   Risk	   Assessment	   (PRA),	   and	   any	   qualiﬁcaIons 	   and	   caveats 	   happening	  
‘oﬀstage’	  (insofar	  as	  they	  happen	  at	  all).	  In	  a 	  recent	  declaraIon	  to	  a 	  UK	  regulator,	  for	  instance,	  Areva,	  a	  
prominent	  French	  nuclear	  manufacturer,	  invoked	  probabilisIc	  calculaIons	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  likelihood	  
of	   a	  “core	  damage	  incident”	  in	   its 	  new	   ‘EPR’	  reactor	  were	  of	   the	  order	  of	   one	   incident	   (per	   reactor)	  
every	  1.6	  million	  years,	  and	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  a 	  core-­‐melt	  is 	  “inﬁnitesimal”	  (in	  Ramana	  
2011).	   Similar	   assessments	   performed	   on	   earlier	   generaIon	   reactors	   like	  Fukushima	  have	   found	   the	  
risks 	  to	  be	  higher,	  but	  sIll 	  nowhere	  of	  an	  order	  that	  would	  jusIfy	  signiﬁcant	  public	  concern.	  An	  on-­‐cited	  
ﬁgure	  that	  framed	  nuclear	  discussions	  before	  2011,	  for	  instance,	  put	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a 	  severe	  accident	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in	  an	  operaIonal	  reactor	  at	  one	  in	  a	  hundred-­‐thousand	  years	  (see	  eg:	  Glaser	  2011).	  Such	  calculaIons	  
legiImate	  almost	   all 	  contemporary	  public	  pronouncements	  and	  policy	   discourse	  about	  nuclear	  power	  
(explaining,	  for	   instance,	  why	   the	  costs	  of	  accidents	  are	  rouInely	   ignored	  when	  weighing	   the	  costs	  of	  
diﬀerent	  energy	  opIons	  [eg:	  OECD	  2010]).
The	  Ideal	  of	  Objec)vity
ReservaIons	  about	  probabilisIc	  numbers	  have	  certainly	   not	   disappeared	  from	  engineering	  discourse,	  
even	  if	   they	  have	  declined	  in	  their	  prominence	  and	  prevalence.	  An	  overview	  of	  a	  2010	  joint	  NASA/NRC	  
meeIng	  to	  discuss	  the	  role	  of	  risk	  assessments,	  for	  example,	  suggests	  the	  discussion	  involved	  a 	  nuanced	  
understanding	  of	   the	  limitaIons	  of	  probabilisIc	  assessments 	  (Youngblood	  et	  al.	  2010);	  it	  even	  goes	  so	  
far	  as 	  to	   emphasize	  the	  line:	  “All	  models	  are	  wrong,	   but	  some	  models 	  are	  useful”	   (Youngblood	  et	  al.	  
2010).	  On	  the	  same	  page,	  however,	  the	  same	  document	  highlights	  the	  perils	  of	   communicaIng	   such	  
complexiIes:	  “Overly	  detailed	  models 	  may	  erode	  decisionmaker	  conﬁdence,”	  it	  cauIons	  (ibid.).	  And	  this	  
laSer	   concern	   is	  more	  illustraIve	  of	   modern	  nuclear	   discourse.	   For	   although	   nuclear	  engineers	  have	  
conInued	   to	  discuss	  the	  nuances	  of	   probabilism,	   such	   discussions	  have	  all	   but	   disappeared	  from	   the	  
dialogues	  between	  those	  experts	  and	  the	  publics	  or	  policymakers	  they	  serve.	  
Despite	   the	   common	   refrain	   of	   nuclear	   regulators	   that	   probabilisIc	   assessments	   are	   intended	   to	  
enhance	  the	  “transparency	  and	  objecIvity	  of	  decisionmaking”	  (NRC	  2002),	  there	  has 	  been	  an	  increasing	  
disconnect	  between	   the	  public	   and	   private	  discourse	  of	   professional	   engineering	   circles.	   Assessment	  
experts	  may	   be	  aware	  of	   the	   limitaIons	  of	   their	  calculaIons,	   in	  other	  words,	  but	  on	   an	   insItuIonal	  
level,	   at	   least,	   they	   acIvely	   occlude	   such	   limitaIons	   from	   non-­‐specialists.	   In	   keeping	   with	   the	  
foundaIonal	   role	   that	   probabilisIc	   assessments	   now	   play	   in	   nuclear	   regulatory	   decisionmaking,	  
regulators,	  together	  with	  the	  industry,	  rouInely	  promulgate	  the	  noIon	  that	  experts	  can	  take	  a	  nuclear	  
power	  plant	  –	  an	  enormously	  complex	  system	  with	  sophisIcated	  socio-­‐organizaIonal	  dimensions	  and	  a	  
stochasIc	  operaIng	  environment	  –	   and	  mathemaIcally	  deduce	   its	  reliability	   to	   seven	   decimal	  places	  
(the	  level	  implied	  by	  some	  projected	  accident	  frequencies).	  
Elsewhere	  (eg:	  Downer	  2011b),	  I	  have	  referred	  to	  this	  idea	  –	   that	  complex	  technological	  properIes	  like	  
risk	  and	  reliability	   should	  be	  wholly,	  objecIvely	  and	  quanItaIvely	  knowable	  through	   formal	  rules	  and	  
unbending	  algorithms	  –	  as	  the	  “Ideal	  of	  Mechanical	  ObjecIvity,”	  a	  phrase	  I	  borrow,	  slightly	  loosely,	  from	  
Porter	   (1995).	  It	   is	  an	  ideal	  that	  characterizes	  most	  modern	  technological	  discourse,	  but	  it	   is	  especially	  
prominent	  in	  the	  context	  of	  nuclear	  power	  (Wynne	  1982).	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  imagine	  why.	  As	  US	  authoriIes	  
determined	  in	  the	  1960s,	  the	  potenIal	  gravity	  of	  nuclear	  accidents	  begs	  for	  declaraIve	  assurances	  and	  
calculaIve	  certainty.
On	   a	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   basis 	   this	   Ideal	   of	   Mechanical	   ObjecIvity	   is	   reﬂected	   in	   the	   subtext	   of	   expert	  
pronouncements	  about	  nuclear	  risk	  (“The	  math	  is	  the	  math”;	  “It’s	  not	  an	  opinion,	  it’s	  a	  calcula'on”).	  It	  is	  
implicitly	   evident	   in	   the	   substanIal	   body	   of	   social	   science	   research	   that	   treats	   nuclear	   risk	   as	   an	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established	  property,	  to	  be	  contrasted,	   for	   instance,	  with	  peoples’	   percepIons	  of	   that	  risk	   (eg:	  Slovic	  
2012;	  Weart	  1988).	  An	  unguarded	   illustraIon	  of	   its 	  prevalence	  in	  nuclear	  regulatory	  discourse	  can	  be	  
found	   the	   NRC’s	   (2004)	   “Guidelines	   for	   External	   Risk	   CommunicaIon”	   –	   a	   brightly	   illustrated	   and	  
uncommonly	   revelatory	  document	   that	   outlines	  a	  straigh{orwardly	   calculaIve	  understanding	   of	   risk,	  
which	   it	   encourages	  regulators 	  to	  defend	   in	  their	  public	  pronouncements.	   “Avoid	  making	   statements	  
such	  as	  ‘I	  cannot	  guarantee…’	  or	   ‘There	  are	  no	   guarantees	  in	   life…’”	   it	  advises,	  as	  “...statements	   like	  
these	  contribute	  to	  public	  outrage	  because	  they	  reinforce	  feelings	  of	  helplessness	  and	  lack	  of	   individual	  
control”	  (NRC	  2004:	  38).	  (It	  is	  worth	  noIng,	  moreover,	  that	  the	  report	  –	  authored	  by	  the	  NRC’s	  Division	  
of	  Systems	  Analysis	   and	  Regulatory	  Eﬀec'veness	   –	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  policymakers	  are	  less	  in	  need	  
of	   such	  protecIon.	  Quite	  the	  opposite.	   In	   a	  sidebar	  reserved	   for	  exemplary	  quotes	  and	  aphorisms	   it	  
says:	  “When	  the	  media	  publishes	  the	  NRC’s 	  talking	  points	  and	  messages	  and	  people	  refer	  to	  them	  for	  
decisionmaking,	  that’s	  success”	  [NRC	  2004:	  48].)
Sociological	  Misgivings
Sociologists	  of	  knowledge	  have	  long	  recognized	  that	  this	  ‘mechanical’	  noIon	  of	   technology	  assessment	  
is 	   idealized,	   and	   have	   worked	   to	   highlight	   its	   shortcomings.	   Most	   such	   criIques	   highlight	   how	  
assessment	  calculaIons	  quietly	  exclude	  other	  consideraIons	  by	   shaping	  what	  Foucault	  would	  call	  the	  
‘condiIons	   of	   discourse’.	   Writers	   such	   as	   Wynne	   (1983);	   Rip	   (1986);	   and	   Otway	   &	  von	  Winterfeldt	  
(1982),	  for	  instance,	  criIcize	  technology	  assessment	  for	  its	  ‘narrowness 	  of	  vision,’	  arguing	   that	  it	  tends	  
to	  impoverish	  deﬁniIons	  of	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  leading	  to	  ever	  more	  reﬁned	  answers	  to	  what	  are	  onen	  the	  
wrong	  quesIons.	  When	  Wynne	  (1983:	  27)	  speaks	  about	  the	  “myth	  of	  expert	  objecIvity,”	  for	  example,	  
he	  is	  poinIng	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  varying	  interpretaIons	  of	  ‘raIonality’	  by	  which	  we	  might	  want	  to	  
judge	  a	  technological	  system.	  Otway	  &	  von	  Winterfeldt	  (1982:	  133)	  make	  a	  similar	  point,	  arguing	  that	  a	  
group’s	   a|tudes	   to	   nuclear	   power	   might	   legiImately	   hinge	   on	   such	   factors	   as	   “…whether	   the	  
technology	  leads	  to	  a	  reliance	  on	  technical	  experts;	  whether	  it	  will	  increase	  economic	  growth;	   […]	   and	  
whether	   it	  will	   increase	  the	  power	   of	   big	   business.”	  All	  of	   which,	   they	   point	  out,	   concern	   social 	  and	  
economic	  maSers	  that	  are	  quite	  separate	  from	  risk	  in	  the	  sense	  invoked	  by	  formal	  risk	  assessments.	  
Most	  criIcs	  in	  this 	  tradiIon	  follow	  a	   similar	  path,	  emphasizing	   the	  ways	   that	   formal	   risk	   calculaIons	  
limit	  discussions 	  about	  social	  prioriIes,	  rather	  than	  exploring	  the	  inherent	  limitaIons	  of	   the	  calculaIons	  
themselves.7	  	  The	  social	  science	  literature	  does,	  however,	  contain	  several	  well-­‐arIculated	  arguments	  for	  
why	   complex	   systems	   like	  nuclear	   plants	  necessarily	   harbor	   risks 	  that	   escape	  the	   calculus	  of	   formal	  
assessments.	  
By	   far	   the	  most	  prominent	  approach	  to	  the	   laSer	  argument	   is	  Normal	  Accident	  Theory	  (NAT)	   (Perrow	  
1999	  [1984]), 	  with	  its 	  simple	  but	  decepIvely	  profound	  insight	  that	  accidents	  caused	  by	  very	  improbable	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7	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  literature	  on	  contemporary	  organizaIons	  oﬀers	  many	  discussions	  of	  complex	  but	  ulImately	  invalid	  calculaIons	  being	  
exploited	  for	  instrumental	  ends	  (e.g.:	  Lampland,	  2010),	  but	  this	  discourse	  rarely	  delves	  into	  the	  ‘hard’	  calculaIons	  of	  scienIsts	  and	  engineers.
conﬂuences	  of	  events	  (which	  no	  risk	  calculaIon	  could	  ever	  anIcipate)	  are	  ‘probable’	  in	  systems	  where	  
there	  are	  many	  opportuniIes	  for	  them	  to	  occur	  (ie:	  that	  the	  organizaIonal	  logic	  of	   extremely	  complex	  
systems	  allows 	  for	  billions	  of	  potenIal	  ‘billion-­‐to-­‐one’	  accidents,	  and	  so	  it	  is	  only	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  we	  
would	  see	  them	  from	  Ime	  to	  Ime.)	   There	  is 	  another	  approach	  to	  this 	  argument,	  however,	  that	  draws	  
on	  the	  sociology	   of	   knowledge	  and	   Science	  and	  Technology	   Studies	   (STS)	   literatures.	   It	  points	  to	   the	  
irreducible	   epistemological	   ambiguity	   of	   all	   technological	   knowledge	   (eg:	   MacKenzie	   1996;	   Wynne	  
1988),	   and	   argues	   that	   this	   ambiguity,	   although	   manageable	   in	   most	   spheres,	   becomes	   crippling	   in	  
assessments	  of	  complex,	  safety-­‐criIcal	  systems	  that	  deal	  with	  very	  small	  probabiliIes	  (Downer	  2011b).	  
These	  sociological	  arguments	  about	  why	  nuclear	   risk	   calculaIons	  must 	  be	   insuﬃcient	  are	   important,	  
especially	  given	  that	  expert	  authoriIes	  are	  inherently	  unwilling	   to	  undermine	  their	  own	  credibility	  and	  
self-­‐interest	  in	  a	  sustained	  way	  (Wynne	  2011:	  xxii).	  At	  the	  same	  Ime,	  however,	  they	  can	  obscure	  a	  more	  
interesIng	  sociological	  quesIon	  about	  why	  Fukushima	  (and,	  indeed,	  the	  disaster-­‐punctuated	  history	  of	  
nuclear	  power	  more	  broadly)	  doesn’t	  speak	  for	  itself.	  
Enduring	  Credibility
Such	   misgivings	   carry	   liSle	  weight	   in	   wider	   public	   discourse,	  however.	   Power	   (2011:	  28)	   argues	  that	  
crises	  damage	  the	  credibility	  of	  experIse,	  but	  the	  history	  of	  nuclear	  risk	  assessment	  seems	  to	  challenge	  
this	  ﬁnding.	   For	   nuclear	   experts	   remain	   credible	   even	   though,	   as	   Ramana	   (2011)	   highlights,	   nuclear	  
disasters	  happen	   far	  more	  onen	  than	  formal	  calculaIons	  predict.	  Indeed,	   the	  fallibility	  of	   nuclear	  risk	  
assessments	  is 	  evinced	  by	  a	  litany	  of	   accidents	  and	  near	  accidents,8	  some	  of	  which	  –	  Windscale;	  Three	  
Mile	   Island;	   Chernobyl	  –	   are	  widely	   recognized	   and	   remembered,	   but	  none	   of	   which	   seem	   to	   have	  
eﬀecIvely	  undermined	  the	  pervasive	  belief	  that	  nuclear	  risks	  can	  be	  calculated	  with	  objecIve	  certainty.9	  
Windscale,	  we	  believe,	  was	  an	  excepIon;	  Chernobyl 	  was	  an	  excepIon;	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  (TMI)	  was	  an	  
excepIon;	  Fuksuhima	  seems	  to	  be	  following	  the	  same	  trajectory.	  
AdmiSedly,	  Fukushima	  has	  led	  to	  policy	  reversals	  in	  some	  spheres,	  most	  notably	  in	  Japan	  and	  Germany,	  
but	  in	  most	  other	  contexts	  it	  has	  done	  liSle	  to	  undermine	  public	  faith	  in	  nuclear	  risk	  calculaIons.	  Even	  
before	  the	  close	  of	   2011	  there	  were	  strong	   indicaIons	  that	  the	  long-­‐anIcipated	  resurgence	  of	  nuclear	  
power	  would	  survive	  the	  disaster,	  and	   by	  March	   2012,	   the	  UN	  was	  predicIng	   that	   the	  global	  use	  of	  
nuclear	   energy	   could	   increase	   by	   as	  much	   as	  100	   percent	   in	   the	  next	   two	   decades,	   and	   projecIng	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8	  Any	  list	  of	  nuclear	  accidents	  will	  be	  inherently	  contenIous,	  but	  Wikipedia	  (as	  of	  Dec.	  2012)	  points	  to	  twenty-­‐four	  “Nuclear	  power	  plant	  
accidents	  and	  incidents	  with	  mulIple	  fataliIes	  and/or	  more	  than	  US$100	  million	  in	  property	  damage.”
9	  Proofs	  of	  low	  probability,	  it	  should	  be	  said,	  are	  not	  absolute	  proofs	  of	  safety.	  So	  it	  is	  true,	  theoreIcally,	  that	  Fukushima’s	  risk	  calculaIons	  
could	  have	  been	  correct	  and	  Japan	  could	  have	  just	  been	  unlucky.	  Given	  the	  levels	  of	  probability	  outlined	  above,	  however,	  Japan	  would	  have	  
had	  to	  have	  been	  incredibly	  unlucky	  for	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  It	  is	  theoreIcally	  possible	  that	  a	  perfectly	  balanced	  coin,	  ﬂipped	  a	  thousand	  Imes,	  
will	  land	  heads-­‐up	  on	  every	  ﬂip.	  But	  if	  this	  actually	  happened,	  then	  any	  a	  priori	  calculaIons	  proving	  the	  coin’s	  ‘perfect	  balance’	  would	  have	  to	  
be	  excepIonally	  convincing	  to	  be	  credible,	  whereas	  nuclear	  risk	  calculaIons	  are	  contested	  at	  best.	  (Even	  if	  Fukushima’s	  assessments	  were	  
correct,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  accident	  should	  undermine	  our	  Bayesian	  conﬁdence	  in	  them.)	  This	  is	  not	  to	  menIon	  the	  other	  nuclear	  accidents,	  of	  
course,	  or	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  below,	  few	  experts	  now	  contest	  that	  there	  were	  fundamental	  errors	  in	  Fukushima’s	  risk	  assessments.
further	  growth	  of	   between	  35	  percent	  and	  100	  percent	  by	  2030	  (In	  Dahl	  2012).	  Such	  predicIons	  were	  
supported	   by	   a	  series	  of	   decisions	   that	   implied	   both	   a	  conInued	   insItuIonal	   conﬁdence	   in	   nuclear	  
power	  and	  a	  large	  degree	  of	   (at	  least	  passive)	   consent	  from	  the	  public.	  Before	  the	  accident,	  a 	  total	  of	  
547	  reactors	  were	  either	  proposed,	  planned	  or	  under	  construcIon	  throughout	  the	  world;	  by	  early	  2012,	  
this	  number	  had	  increased	  to	  558	  (Holloway	  2012).	  In	  February	  2012,	  Britain	  and	  France	  signed	  a	  formal	  
agreement	   that	  paved	  the	  way	   for	  a	  new	  generaIon	  of	   reactors	  in	  both	  countries	  (Press	  AssociaIon	  
2012;	  BBC	  2012).	  That	  same	  month,	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  NRC	  approved	  licenses	  to	  build	  two	  new	  reactors	  in	  
Georgia,	  the	  ﬁrst	  such	  approvals 	  since	  TMI	  in	  1979	  (Abernethy	  2012).	  The	  following	  month	  it	  approved	  
two	  more	  in	  South	  Carolina	  (Wingﬁeld	  &	  Johnsson	  2012).
At	   the	   risk	   of	   trivializing	   a	  serious	   issue,	   the	   relaIonship	  between	  public	   discourse	   and	   nuclear	   risk	  
assessment	  might	  be	  compared	  with	  a	  recurrent	  scene	  in	  Charles	  Schulz’s 	  pensive	  comic	  strip,	  Peanuts.	  
In	  the	  ﬁrst	  such	  scene,	  Charlie	  asks 	  Lucy	  to	  hold	  a	  football	  for	  him	  to	  kick.	  Lucy	  obliges	  only	  to	  whip	  the	  
ball 	  away	  at	  the	  last	  second,	  causing	  him	  to	  fall.	  The	  scene’s	  subsequent	  iteraIons	  always	  involve	  Lucy	  
convincing	   Charlie	  that	  ‘this	  Ime	  it	  will 	  be	  diﬀerent’	  and	   that	  he	  should	   trust	  her	  to	  hold	  the	  football,	  
only	  for	  her	  to	  pull	  the	  same	  stunt	  again	  and	  again.	  Charlie	  is	  fooled	  in	  this 	  way	  for	  years,	  always 	  giving	  
in	  to	  Lucy’s	  reasonable	  explanaIons	  and	  never	  learning	  the	  larger	  lesson	  that	  Lucy	  is	  not	  to	  be	  trusted.	  
Western	   socieIes,	   we	   might	   say,	   have	   a	   similar	   relaIonship	   with	   nuclear	   experIse.	   The	   nuclear	  
establishment	   seems	   to	   enjoy	   a	   ‘Lucy-­‐esque’	   ability	   to	   jusIfy	   why	   its	  past	   failings	   should	   not	   count	  
against	   the	  current	   and	   future	   credibility	   of	   its 	  assurances.	  We	  keep	  being	   asked	   to	   take	  a 	  punt	   on	  
calculaIons	  that	  then	  let	  us 	  down,	  but	  aner	  each	  failure	  our	  conﬁdence	  rebounds	  and	  we	  bet	  again	  on	  
‘calculaIve	   certainty.’	   Proponents	   of	   nuclear	   reliability	   calculaIons,	   in	   other	   words,	   have	   rouInely	  
found	  ways	  to	  ‘escape’	  from	  being	  tarred	  by	  evidence	  of	  their	  apparent	  failures	  –	  ways	  to	  maintain	  their	  
credibility,	  even	  as 	  the	  consequences	  of	  past	  accidents 	  loom	  large	  in	  the	  public	  imaginaIon	  and	  heavy	  
on	   the	   public	   purse.	   These	   arguments	   are	   so	   convincing	   that	   even	   Fukushima,	   with	   all 	   its	   visceral	  
undeniability,	  cannot	  compel	  publics	  and	  policymakers	  to	  recognize	  that	  reliability	  calculaIons	  are	  less	  
credible	  than	  they	  appear.	  
The	  remainder	  of	   this	  essay	  will	  examine	  the	  shape	  of	   these	  arguments,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  
are	  credible.
2.	  RATIONALIZING	  THE	  MELTDOWN
The	   quesIon	   of	   when	   it	   should	   be	   appropriate	   to	   reject	   a	   belief	   has 	   long	   been	   of	   interest	   to	  
philosophers	  of	   science.	  Karl	  Popper	  (1959),	  for	  instance,	  is	  widely	  (if	  slightly	  inaccurately)	  remembered	  
for	   arguing	   that	   all	   knowledge-­‐claims 	   are	   essenIally	   theories	   that	   should	   be	   discarded	   if	   they	   are	  
disproven	  (‘falsiﬁed’)	  by	  experience.	  A	  strict	  Popperian,	  then,	  might	  consider	  the	  Fukushima	  meltdowns	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to	  be	  proof	  that	  nuclear	  reliability	  assessments 	  are	  inaccurate,	  and	  balk	  at	  our	  refusal	  to	  acknowledge	  
the	  falsiﬁcaIon	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  such	  assessments	  are	  trustworthy.	  
As	  historians	   and	  philosophers	  of	   knowledge	   have	   long	   acknowledged,	  however,	   an	   unwillingness	  to	  
bow	  before	  seemingly	  disconﬁrming	   evidence	  is	  not	  unusual	  in	   science,	  and	  is 	  not	  always	  desirable	  in	  
principle	  (eg:	   Stanford	  2009;	  Duhem	  1954;	  Quine	  1960).	  They	  point	  out	  that	  no	  ‘disproof’	  can	  ever	  be	  
conclusive.	   An	   amateur	   scienIst	  who	   tests	   the	   boiling	   point	   of	   water	   and	  ﬁnds	   it	   to	   be	   98	  degrees	  
Celsius,	  for	  instance,	   is	  far	  more	  likely	   to	  have	  discovered	  a	  faulty	  thermometer	  than	  to	  have	  ‘falsiﬁed’	  
the	  claim	  that	  water	  boils	  at	  100	  degrees.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  purity	  of	   the	  water	  and	  the	  workings	  of	  
the	  thermometer	  can	  themselves	  be	  treated	  as	  theories,	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  contested	  in	  lieu	  of	  the	  boiling	  
point.10	  So	  it	  is	  that	  scienIsts	  rouInely	  hold	  onto	  theories	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  contrary	  evidence.	  Newton	  
did	  not	  abandon	  his	  theories	  of	  gravity	  simply	  because	  he	  lacked	  a	  good	  explanaIon	  for	  birds.	  
It	   is	   arguably	   misleading,	   therefore,	   to	   see	   Fukushima	   as	   self-­‐evident	   proof	   that	   nuclear	   reliability	  
assessment	  cannot	  work	  or	  that	  nuclear	  authoriIes	  are	  in	  denial.	  For	  in	  much	  the	  same	  vein	  as 	  Popper’s	  
criIcs	  above,	  the	  discourse	  around	  Fukushima	  not	  only	  denies	  that	  the	  accident	  discredits	  the	  pracIce	  
of	  reliability	  assessment,	  it	  also	  oﬀers	  raIonales	  for	  why	  the	  accident	  should	  not	  disprove	  the	  claims 	  of	  
expert	  reliability	  calculaIons	  more	  broadly.	  
These	  broad	  raIonales	  are	  woven	  into	  diverse	  and	  highly	  overlapping	   narraIves.	  To	  understand	   their	  
underlying	  logics,	  however,	  It	  helps	  to	  parse	  them	  into	  four	  core	  arguments:	  
i. That	  the	  assessments	  did	  not	  actually	  fail	  (what	  I	  will	  call	  the	  interpre've	  defense).
ii. That	  the	  failure	  of	  one	  assessment	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  credibility	  of	  others 	  (what	  I	  will	  call	  the	  
relevance	  defense).
iii. That	   the	   assessments	  were	   sound,	   but	   people	   did	   not	   obey	   the	   rules	   (what	   I	   will 	   call 	   the	  
compliance	  defense).
iv. That	   the	   assessments	  were	   ﬂawed,	   but	   now	   they	   are	   ﬁxed	   (what	   I	   will	   call	   the	   redemp'on	  
defense).
I	  will	  sketch	  each	  of	  these	  in	  turn,	  before	  discussing	  their	  merits	  in	  a	  later	  secIon.
i.	  The	  Interpre)ve	  Defense
One	  way	  of	   insulaIng	  reliability	  assessments	  from	  a	  nuclear	  accident	  is 	  simply	  to	  deny	  there	  has	  been	  a	  
failure.	  Occasionally	  such	  denials	  are	  straigh{orwardly	  untrue,	  such	  as	  when	  Soviet	  authoriIes	  denied	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10	  Philosophers,	  following	  Duhem,	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  the	  ‘underdeterminaIon	  of	  theory	  by	  evidence’,	  or	  someImes	  as	  ‘conﬁrmaIon	  holism’.
the	   accident	  at	  Chernobyl,	  even	   as	   they	  were	  organizing	   mass	  evacuaIons	   (Perrow	  2011b:	   50).	   Such	  
denials	  are	  rarely	  so	  ostensively	  mendacious,	  however,	  as	  most	  exploit	   the	  fact	  that	  the	  deﬁniIon	  of	  
‘failure’	  is	  open	  to	  legiImate	  interpretaIon.	  
It	   is	   rarely	   straigh{orward	   to	  say	   when,	   or	   if,	   a	  nuclear	   plant	  has 	  deﬁniIvely	   ‘failed.’	   In	   part,	   this 	  is	  
because	  all	   reactors 	  are	  designed	   to	   tolerate	   some	  degree	  of	   malfuncIon	  –	   not	   every	  blown	  fuse	  or	  
broken	  valve	   at	   reactor	   consItutes 	  a	  ‘failure’	  of	   the	  plant	  or	   a	  nuclear	   ‘accident,’	   for	  example	  –	   and	  
reliability	  calculaIons	  reﬂect	  this.	  On	  a	  slightly	  deeper	   level,	  moreover,	   criIcal	  technologies	  are	  onen	  
designed	  to	  fail 	  ‘safely’.	  Reactors	  have	  containment	  structures	  designed	  to	  keep	  failures	  from	  becoming	  
major	  public	  hazards,	  for	   instance,	  and	  reliability	  analyses	  account	   for	  this	  as	  well.	  If	  an	  unanIcipated	  
reactor	  event	  is 	  relaIvely	  contained,	   therefore,	   then	  observers 	  can	  plausibly	   say	   that	  the	  plant	  –	   as	  a	  
system	   –	   has	  funcIoned	  as	  designed,	  and	  that	  there	  was	  no	   real	   ‘accident’	   that	  should	  challenge	  the	  
validity	  of	  its	  reliability	  assessments.	  
The	  spectacular	  failure	  of	   Fukushima,	  we	  might	  think,	  should	  have	  been	  unambiguous	  in	  these	  regards.	  
Yet	  even	  as	  the	  signiﬁcance	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  disaster	  became	  undeniable,	  experts	  were	  able	  to	  further	  
parse	  the	  deﬁniIon	  of	  ‘failure’	  to	  deny	  that	  their	  assessments	  had	  failed.	  This	  was	  visible,	  for	  instance,	  in	  
the	  many	  ‘beyond	  design	  basis’	  arguments.	  
The	  ‘design	  basis’	  of	   a	  nuclear	  plant	  is	  the	  set	  of	  assumpIons	  that	  frame	  the	  work	  of	   the	  experts	  who	  
design	  and	  assess	  that	  plant.	  So	  if	   the	  design	  basis	  states	  that	  the	  worst	  ﬂood	   a	  nuclear	   plant	  will 	  be	  
subjected	  to	  is	  ten	  meters,	  and	  the	  plant	  fails	  because	  it	   is	  ﬂooded	  to	  a	  depth	  of	   twenty	  meters,	  then	  
both	   the	  engineers	  who	  built	   the	  plant	  and	   the	  assessors	  who	   cerIﬁed	   it	  can	   deny	   they	   have	   failed	  
because	  the	  ﬂooding	  was	  ‘beyond	  design	  basis’.	  There	  were	  no	  errors	  in	  their	  calculaIons,	  they	  can	  say,	  
because	  the	  calculaIons	  never	  claimed	   that	  the	  plant	  could	  survive	  such	  events;	   it	   is	  not	  their	   fault	  if	  
Fukushima	  was	  struck	  by	  what	  insurance	  contracts	  refer	  to	  as	  an	  ‘Act	  of	  God’.	  As	  the	  American	  Nuclear	  
Society	  (2011)	  put	  it,	  for	  instance:	  Fukushima	  "...could	  actually	  be	  considered	  a	  'success'	  given	  the	  scale	  
of	  this	  natural	  disaster	  that	  had	  not	  been	  considered	  in	  the	  original	  design.”	  A	  view	  that	  was	  echoed	  by	  
Sir	  David	  King,	  the	  former	  chief	  scienIﬁc	  advisor	  to	  the	  UK	  Government,	  who,	  shortly	  aner	  the	  accident,	  
reassured	  the	  press	  that	  all	  the	  nuclear	  plants	  aﬀected	  by	  the	  tsunami	  had	  “acted	  as	  they	  were	  meant	  
to,	   including	   Fukushima"	   and	   that	  the	  tsunami	  was	  "an	   extremely	   unlikely	  event"	   that	   overwhelmed	  
defenses	  designed	  for	  much	  lower	  levels 	  of	  ﬂooding	  (in	  Harvey	  2011);	  and	  which	  appears	  in	  even	  purer	  
from	  in	  this	  passage	  in	  the	  New	  American:	  
“...the	   Fukushima	   “disaster”	   will	   become	   the	   rallying	   cry	   against	   nuclear	   power.	   Few	   will	  
remember	  that	  the	  plant	  stayed	  generally	  intact	  despite	  being	  hit	  by	  an	  earthquake	  with	  more	  
than	  six	  Imes	  the	  energy	  the	  plant	  was	  designed	  to	  withstand,	  plus	  a 	  tsunami	  esImated	  at	  49	  
feet	  that	  swept	  away	  backup	  generators	  33	  feet	  above	  sea	  level”	  (Hiserodt	  2011).
ii.	  The	  Relevance	  Defense.
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A	   second	  means	  of	   logically	  protecIng	   the	  credibility	  of	   nuclear	   risk-­‐assessment	  from	   a	   conspicuous	  
failure	   is	  to	  isolate	   the	  failed	  assessment	  and	  then	  establish	  that	  it	  is 	  unrepresenta've	   of	   assessment	  
pracIces	  as	  whole.	  If	   accounts	  can	  show	   that	  Fukushima’s	  (or,	  more	  widely,	  Japan’s)	   risk	  calculaIons	  
were	   signiﬁcantly	   diﬀerent	   from	   other	   such	   calcula'ons,	   in	   other	   words,	   then	   the	   failings	   of	   those	  
calcula'ons	  can	  be	  theirs	  alone.	  
Claims	   about	   relevance	   and	   representaIveness,	   in	   varying	   guises,	   are	   extremely	   common	   in	   the	  
discourse	  around	  Fukushima,	  (as	  they	  are	  in	  the	  discourse	  around	  most	  technological	  accidents).	  Most	  
are	  framed	  around	  the	  representaIveness	  of	  the	  technology	  itself.	  A	  report	  for	  the	  American	  Academy	  
of	  Arts	  and	  Sciences,	  for	  instance,	  explained	  that	  the	  plant’s 	  reactors	  (GE	  Mark-­‐1s)	  did	  “...not	  reﬂect	  the	  
safety	   improvements 	  of	   more	   recently	   designed	   reactors”	   (Marvel	   &	   May	   2011:	   3),	  while	  Guardian	  
columnist	  George	  Monbiot	  (2011b),	  echoed	  the	  voice	  of	  many	  journalists	  when	  he	  described	  the	  facility	  
as	   “a 	  crappy	   old	   plant	  with	   inadequate	  safety	   features”.	   Logically,	   of	   course,	   such	   claims	  about	   the	  
plant’s	  design	  do	  liSle	  to	  redeem	  the	  pracIces	  by	  which	  it	  was	  assessed	  and	  approved,	  but	  they	  onen	  
imply	   that	  assessment	   pracIces	  evolved	  with	   the	   technology,	  with	   the	   result	   that	   the	  pracIces	  that	  
governed	  the	  Mark-­‐1’s 	  approval	  are	  no	  longer	   characterisIc	   of	   assessment	   pracIces	  more	  generally.	  
There	  are	  echoes	  of	  this	  argument,	  for	  instance,	  in	  an	  internal	  UK	  government	  email	  sent	  soon	  aner	  the	  
accident	  (and	  later	  published	  in	  the	  Guardian)	  where	  a	  civil	  servant	  writes:	  “We	  need	  to	  […]	  show	  that	  
events	  in	  Japan,	  whilst	  looking	  dramaIc,	  are	  all	  part	  of	  the	  safety	  processes	  of	  this	  1960’s	  reactor.”11
Another	  very	  common	  form	  of	   the	  relevance	  defense	  rests 	  on	   claims 	  about	  the	  representaIveness	  of	  
Fukushima’s	   speciﬁc	   assessment	   regime	   and	   regulatory	   environment.	   These	   claims	   onen	   draw	  
disIncIons	  between	  what	  happened	  “over	  there”	  (in	  Japan)	  and	  what	  goes	  on	  “over	  here”	  (in	  Europe/
US)	   (Gusterson	  2011;	  Greene	  2012).	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  for	  instance,	  reported	  at	  length	  on	  Japanese	  
regulatory	   shortcomings,	   running	   arIcles	  with	   Itles 	  such	   as	   “Culture	   of	   Complicity	   Tied	   to	   Stricken	  
Nuclear	  Plant,”	  (Onishi	  &	  Belson	  2011);	  and	  “Japan	  ignored	  or	  long	  hid	  nuclear	  risks”	  (Onishi	  &	  Fackler	  
2011b).	   Many	   oﬃcial	   reports	   have	   followed	   suit,	   with	   even	   the	  oﬃcial	   report	   of	   the	   Japanese	  Diet	  
ﬁnding	   that	   the	   accident’s 	   “fundamental	   causes”	   lay	   in	   the	   “ingrained	   convenIons	   of	   Japanese	  
culture”	  (NAIIC	  2012:	  9).	  
iii.	  The	  Compliance	  Defense.
As	   the	   headlines	   above	   suggest,	   most	   (although	   not	   all)12 	   of	   the	   arguments	   about	   Japanese	  
excepIonalism	  aSribute	  the	  disaster	  to	  an	  unusual	  degree	  of	  malfeasance	  or	  incompetence	  on	  behalf	  of	  
its	  operators	  and	  overseers.	  The	  report	  to	  the	  Japanese	  Diet,	  for	  instance,	  strongly	   recommended	  that	  
Fukushima	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  ‘man-­‐made’	  disaster	  (NAIIC	  2012),	  while	  an	  earlier	  report	  by	  the	  Carnegie	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11 	   See:	  hSp://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/interacIve/2011/jun/30/email-­‐nuclear-­‐uk-­‐government-­‐fukushima?intcmp=239	   (accessed	   Jun	  
2012).
12	  Some,	  for	  instance,	  aSribute	  it	  to	  Japan’s	  unusual	  seismic	  acIvity.
Endowment	  for	   InternaIonal	   Peace	  came	   to	  much	   the	   same	   conclusion	   (Acton	  &	  Hibbs	  2012a).	   The	  
press,	  meanwhile,	   highlighted	   a	  spectrum	   of	   purported	  malfeasances	   (eg:	   Ichida 	  et	  al.	  2011;	   Broder	  
2011),	  reporIng,	  for	  instance,	  that	  TEPCO	  (the	  operator)	  had	  covered-­‐up	  a	  series 	  of	  regulatory	  breaches	  
for	  years,	   including	  data	  about	  cracks	  in	  criIcal	  circulaIon	  pipes	  that	  could	  have	  been	   instrumental	  in	  
the	  catastrophe	  (eg:	  Adelstein	  &	  McNeill	  2011).	  
HighlighIng	   human	  failure	  in	  such	  ways	  oﬀers	  a	  third	  narraIve	  through	  which	  accounts	  of	  Fukushima	  
can	   redeem	   the	   credibility	   of	   risk	   assessments.	   This 	   is	   because	   we	   (as	   a	   society)	   rouInely	   allow	  
technology	   assessments	   to	   assume,	   within	   certain	   bounds,	   that	   the	   people	   operaIng	   or	   regulaIng	  
criIcal	  systems	  will	  strictly	  adhere	  to	  rules,	  or,	  at	  minimum,	  will	  only	  violate	  those	  rules	  in	  predictable	  
and	   circumscribed	   ways	   (Downer	   2011a:	   276-­‐7).13 	   In	   other	   words,	   all	   technology	   risk	   assessments	  
embody	  implicit	  and	  explicit	  caveats,	  such	  as:	  “...given	  proper	  maintenance,”	  or	  “...if	  handled	  correctly,”	  
and	   because	  we	  accept	   these	   caveats	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   exculpate	  the	  assessments	   aner	   a	  disaster	   by	  
highlighIng	  operator-­‐error,	  noncompliance	  or	  malfeasance	  –	  to	  claim,	  essenIally,	  that	  the	  ‘calcula'ons	  
would	  have	  been	  sound	  if	  people	  had	  only	  obeyed	  the	  rules.’
Accounts	  of	  the	  errors	  and	  wrongdoings	  around	  Fukushima	  overwhelmingly	  invoke	  this 	  argument.	  They	  
‘isolate’	  the	  accident	  by	  blaming	  it	  on	  the	  human	  failings,	  which	  they	  then	  construe	  as	  local	  deviances	  
from	  the	  norm	  rather	  than	  as 	  fundamental	  problems	  with	  the	  norm	  itself.	  The	  implicaIon,	  again,	  being	  
that	  the	  disaster	  is	  not	  (or	  need	  not	  be)	   ‘relevant’	  to	  other	  reactors	  or	  risk	  assessments.	  The	  Carnegie	  
report,	  for	  instance,	  carries	  the	  Itle	  “Why	  Fukushima	  Was	  preventable”	  and,	  aner	  documenIng	  a	  series	  
of	   organizaIonal	   errors,	   concludes	   that:	   “In	   the	   ﬁnal	   analysis,	   the	   […]	   accident	   does	   not	   reveal	   a	  
previously	  unknown	  fatal	  ﬂaw	  associated	  with	  nuclear	  power”	  (Acton	  &	  Hibbs	  2012a:	  2).	   (A	  conclusion	  
echoed	  by	  the	  NAIIC	  report).
This 	  defense	  leans	  on	  more	  than	  Japanese	  excepIonalism,	  however,	  with	  some	  accounts	  of	  Fukushima	  
point	  to	  more	  widespread	  errors	  and	  malfeasances.	  Accounts	  that	  noted	  the	  plant’s	  lack	  of	  guidance	  for	  
operaIons	  under	  extreme	  crisis,	  for	   instance,	   could	   hardly	   ignore	  that	  such	  guidance	  was	  deﬁcient	   in	  
the	  US	   and	  elsewhere	   (eg:	   Lochbaum	   2011).	  On	  these	  occasions	  a	  diﬀerent	  logic	   invariably	   serves	  to	  
redeem	  the	  credibility	  of	  nuclear	  reliability	  assessments:	  the	  argument	  that	  such	  problems	  are	  ‘ﬁxable.’	  
The	   Carnegie	   Endowment	   report,	   for	   instance,	   suggested	   that	   accidents 	  might	   be	   prevented	   in	   the	  
future	  by	  “...periodically	  reevaluaIng	  plant	  safety	  in	  light	  of	   […]	  evolving	  best	  pracIces”	  (Acton	  &	  Hibbs	  
2012:	  2).	  
In	  fact,	  this	  ‘promise	  of	  perfecIbility’	  is 	  prominent	  enough	  to	  merit	  being	  highlighted	  as	  a 	  ﬁnal	  logic	  by	  
which	  to	  defend	  assessments	  from	  disaster.	  To	  wit:
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13 	  It	   is	  understood,	   for	   instance,	   that	  pilots	   get	  Ired	  and	  someImes	  respond	  inaccurately	  when	  under	   pressure,	   and	   this	   is	  why	  rules	   sIpulate	  
(and	  risk	  assessments	  assume)	  that	  there	  be	  two	  in	  a	  cockpit	  to	  share	  loads	  and	  check	  each	  other’s	  work.
iv.	  The	  Redemp)on	  Defense.
“If	   nuclear	  power	   is 	  to	  have	  a	  future	  in	   this	  country...”	  declared	  a 	  New	  York	  Times	  editorial	  aner	   the	  
accident,	  “...Americans	  have	  to	  have	  conﬁdence	  that	  regulators	  and	  the	  industry	  are	  learning	  the	  lessons	  
of	   Fukushima	   and	   taking	   all	   steps	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   safety”	   (NYT	   2011).	   This	   senIment	   neatly	  
captures	  a	  ﬁnal	  approach	  to	  redeeming	   risk	  assessments,	  which	  is 	  simply	  to	  concede	  the	  existence	  of	  
errors	  in	  the	  plant’s	  risk	   calculaIons	   (in	  their	  assumpIons	  about	   tsunamis,	  for	   instance)	   and	   then	  to	  
argue	  that	  experts	  have	  iden'ﬁed	  the	  errors,	  altered	  the	  assessments,	  and	  remedied	  the	  problem.	  In	  this	  
way	   even	   far-­‐reaching	   assessment	   failures 	   can	   be	   made	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   credibility	   of	   future	  
assessments.
Such	  arguments	  are	  implicit	  in	  almost	  all 	  the	  discourse	  around	  Fukushima.	  In	  the	  immediate	  anermath	  
of	   the	  accident,	   for	   example,	   various	  naIons	  and	   organizaIons	  announced	  plans	  to	   review	   their	   risk	  
assessment	  pracIces 	  for	  errors.	  The	  EU,	  for	  instance,	  announced	  it	  would	  reassess	  all	  its	  nuclear	  plants	  
(Willsher	  2011).	  As	  did	  the	  NRC,	  which,	  aner	  its	  own	  swin	  review,	  publicly	   found	  that	  its	  assessments	  
"do	  not	   adequately	  weigh	  the	  risk”	  of	   threats	  to	  emergency	   generators	  (Wald	   2011).	  Of	   course,	  with	  
each	  devil	  uncovered	  in	  the	  details	  of	   the	  assessment	  process	  there	  came	  an	  exorcism.	  The	  NRC	  began	  
reframing	   its	   assessments	   to	   beSer	   account	   for	   the	   newly	   apparent	   threats	   of	   ﬂooding.	   The	   IAEA	  
announced	  a	  ‘ﬁve-­‐point	  plan’	  to	  strengthen	  reactor	  oversight	  around	  the	  world	  (Amano	  2011).	  
It	  is 	  not	   clear	  that	  many	  of	   these	   reviews	  led	  to	   substanIal	  correcIons.	  When	   the	  NRC	  subsequently	  
approved	   the	   licenses	   for	   two	   new	   reactors	   in	   Georgia,	   for	   instance,	   it	   did	   so	   with	   no	   binding	  
commitment	   to	   implement	   changes	   in	   federal	   requirements	   arising	   from	   the	   NRC's	  post-­‐Fukushima	  
work,	   (a	  factor	  that	  led	  then	  NRC	  Chairman,	  Gregory	  Jaczko,	  to	  vote	  against	  the	  approval)	   (Abernethy	  
2012).	  It	   is	  extremely	   diﬃcult,	  moreover,	  to	   imagine	  that	  such	   reviews	  would	  ever	  conclude	   that	   the	  
assessment	  process	  was	  fundamentally	  unrealizable.	  This	  was	  not	  their	  purpose.	  	  	  
3.	  REDEMPTION	  CROSS-­‐EXAMINED
Here,	   then,	   are	  four	   narraIves	  of	   redempIon,	  encompassing	   arguments	   about	  deﬁniIon,	   relevance,	  
compliance	   and	   correcIon.	   Four	   tropes	   through	   which	   accounts	   of	   Fukushima	   can	   implicitly	   and	  
explicitly	  reconcile	  the	  unexpectedness	  of	   the	  accident	  with	  the	  Mechanical	  Ideal	  of	  ObjecIvity	  and	  the	  
idea	  that	  quanItaIve	  risk	  assessments,	  despite	  their	  failure	  in	  this	  instance,	  should	  remain	  credible	  as 	  a	  
basis	  for	  nuclear	  policy.	  But	  how	   credible	  are	  these	  narraIves?	   This	  quesIon	  will 	  be	  the	  focus	  of	   the	  
next	  part	  of	  this	  paper.
Without	   doubt,	   the	  narraIves	   outlined	   above	   can	   be	   rhetorically	   compelling,	   and	   they	   undoubtedly	  
contain	  a	  degree	  of	   truth.	  Failure	  is	  an	  ambiguous	  property.	  Assessment	  pracIces	  do 	  diﬀer	  in	  ways	  that	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limit	   the	  broader	  relevance	  of	   speciﬁc	  shortcomings.	  People	  can	  undermine	  assessment	  calculaIons	  if	  
they	   break	   prescribed	   rules,	   (and	   clearly	   some	   did	   break	   rules 	   in	   this	   instance).	   Risk	   calculaIons	  
undoubtedly	  will 	  improve	  with	  the	  lessons	  of	  experience.	  And	  so,	  in	  Fukushima’s 	  wake,	  it	  is	  vital	  that	  we	  
endeavor	  to	  more	  accurately	  weigh	   evidence	  of	   harm;	  examine	  ways 	  that	   assessment	  regimes	  diﬀer;	  
highlight	  errors	  and	  wrongdoings;	  and	  hone	  assessments 	  by	   idenIfying	  errors.	  To	  return	  brieﬂy	  to	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  science:	  it	  is	  undeniably	  good	  and	  necessary	  that	  nuclear	  regulators,	  like	  scienIsts,	  do	  not	  
always	  abandon	  their	  theories	  and	  pracIces	  at	  the	  ﬁrst	  signs	  of	  falsifying	  evidence.	  	  
At	   the	  same	  Ime,	  however,	   Karl	  Popper,	  champion	  of	   ‘falsiﬁability’,	  undeniably	   had	  a 	  point	  when	  he	  
argued	   that	  we	  someImes	   have	   to	   let	   ideas	  be	   disproven	   by	   experience.	   Insofar	   as	   scienIsts 	  have	  
improved	   their	  understanding	  of	   the	  world	  over	  Ime	   (and	  clearly	   they	  have),	   it	   is	  because	  they	  have	  
onen	  abandoned	  cherished	  paradigms	  because	  of	   disconﬁrming	  evidence.	  Evidence	  might	  be	  inﬁnitely	  
interpretable,	  as	  Popper’s	  criIcs	  suggest,	  but	  there	  has	  to	  come	  a 	  Ime	  when	  it	  becomes	  too	  credible	  to	  
ignore,	  even	  if	  not	  everyone	  agrees.	  
With	  this	  in	  mind,	  therefore,	  it	  is 	  worth	  looking	  criIcally	  at	  the	  ‘redempIon	  narraIves’	  outlined	  above.	  
The	  following	  secIon	  of	  this	  paper	  will	  brieﬂy	  weigh	  the	  merits	  of	  each	  in	  turn.
i.	  Interpreta)on	  Reexamined
When	  considered	  criIcally,	  the	  ‘interpreIve	  defense’	  –	   emphasizing	   the	  plant’s	   ‘design	  basis’	  and	  the	  
ambiguous	  deﬁniIon	  of	   failure	  –	   is 	  diﬃcult	  to	  defend.	  For	  while	   it	   is	  undoubtedly	  useful	   to	  parse	  the	  
meaning	   of	   failure	   in	   many	   contexts,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   deny	   that	   Fukushima’s	   meltdowns	   represent	   an	  
assessment	  shor{all;	  especially	  given	  that	  this	  view	  has	  since	  become	  orthodoxy	  among	  the	  regulatory	  
community	  itself	  (see	  eg:	  NAIIC	  2012).
The	  logic	  of	  the	  ‘beyond-­‐design-­‐basis’	  argument,	  for	  instance,	  has	  merits	  in	  some	  circumstances	  but	  falls	  
down	  when	  used	  to	   jusIfy	  assessment	  failures.	  Nobody	  denies	  that	  the	  earthquake	  and	  tsunami	  were	  
beyond	  Fukushima’s	  design	  basis.	  But	  although	  this	  exculpates	  many	  of	  the	  individuals	  involved	  in	  the	  
plant’s	  design	  and	  construcIon	  (they	  could	  only	  build	  the	  plant	  to	  the	  speciﬁcaIons	  they	  were	  given),	  it	  
does	   very	   liSle	   to	   redeem	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   plant’s	   regulatory	   assessments.	   The	  real	   art	   of	   risk	  
calculaIon	  does	  not	  just	  involve	  applying	  formulae	  correctly,	  but	  framing	  those	  formulae	  correctly.	  The	  
design	   basis	   of	   a	   nuclear	   plant,	   almost	   by	   deﬁniIon,	   should	   be	   an	   accurate	   representaIon	   of	   the	  
condiIons	   the	  plant	   will	   encounter	   in	   its	   lifeIme.	   To	   say	   that	   an	   event	   was	   ‘beyond	   design	   basis,’	  
therefore,	   is	   essenIally	   to	   say	   that	  an	   integral	  element	   of	   the	   assessment	  was	  wrong.	   It	   is 	  diﬃcult,	  
therefore,	  to	  see	  how	  a	  failure	  to	  anIcipate	  the	  possible	  severity	  of	  a	  natural	  hazard	  does	  not	  consItute	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an	   assessment	   failure.	   Extreme	  natural	   hazards,	   aner	   all,	   are	   precisely	   the	  kind	   of	   occurrences	   that	  
expert	  risk	  assessors	  try	  to	  envision	  in	  their	  calculaIons.14	  
ii.	  Relevance	  reexamined.
‘Relevance	  claims’	   feature	  prominently	   in	  the	  discourse	  around	   all	  nuclear	  disasters.	  Aner	  Three	  Mile	  
Island,	  for	  instance,	  authoriIes	  worked	  hard	  to	  assure	  the	  public	  that	  it	  was	  an	  excepIonal	  event	  with	  
liSle	  bearing	   on	  nuclear	   power	  more	  generally:	   a	   “teething	   accident”	  as	  Socolow	   (2011)	   would	   later	  
characterize	   it.	   Indeed,	   just	   three	   years	   before	   Chernobyl,	   the	   head	   of	   the	   IAEA's	   safety	   division	  
conﬁdently	   concluded	   that	   its	   design	   made	   a	   TMI-­‐type	   meltdown	   “pracIcally	   impossible,”	   when	  
discussing	  its 	  reactor	  type	  (RMBK)	   in	  the	  IAEA	  Bulle'n	  (Semenov	  1983:	  51);	  a	  view	  that	  was	  repeatedly	  
echoed	  by	   the	  soviet	  authoriIes.	  This,	  of	   course,	  was	  soon	   disproven.	   But	  this 	  did	  not	   stop	  Western	  
observers	  from	  making	  much	  the	  same	  claim	  again	  about	  Chernobyl.	  Aner	  the	  Soviet	  disaster	  Western	  
observers	  drew	  an	  invisible	  line	  around	  the	  Iron	  Curtain	  and	  claimed	  it	  was 	  an	  excepIon	  that	  said	  very	  
liSle	  about	   their	   own	   reactor	   designs	   and	   assessment	   pracIces	   –	   “a	   Soviet	   accident,	   not	   a	  nuclear	  
accident”	  as	  many	   oﬃcials 	  would	   later	   refer	   to	   it.	   It	   became	  rouIne	  for	  Western	  experts 	  to	  exclude	  
Chernobyl	  from	  their	  assessment	  calculaIons,	  as	  could	  be	  seen,	   for	  instance,	  when	  the	  Indian	  Nuclear	  
Commission	  assured	  visitors	  to	   its	  website	  that	  “The	  staIsIcal	  risk	   from	  living	  next	  to	  an	  intelligently-­‐
designed	  (i.e.,	  not	  RBMK)	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  is	  equivalent	  to	  driving	  125	  feet”[emphasis	  added].15	  
This 	   history	   of	   misleading	   assurances	   is 	   the	   appropriate	   lens	   through	   which	   to	   view	   claims	   about	  
Fukushima’s	   excepIonalism,	   the	   logic	   of	   which	   quickly	   begins	   to	  wilt	   under	   close	  scruIny.	   Take	   for	  
instance,	   the	  claims	  of	   Japanese	  excepIonalism.	  Fukushima	  was	  a 	  Japanese	  facility,	  but	   its	  GE	  Mark-­‐1	  
reactors 	  were	  designed	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  are	  sIll	  employed	  in	  23	  US	  plants	  (Marvel	  &	  May	  2011:	  
3).	   This	  means	   the	   design	  must	   have	   been	   speciﬁcally	   assessed	   and	   approved	   by	   US	   authoriIes 	  on	  
various	  occasions,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  authoriIes	  in	  a	  range	  of	  countries	  that	  constructed	  the	  same	  reactors	  at	  
diﬀerent	  Imes	  (these	  include	  Switzerland,	  Spain,	  The	  Netherlands,	  Italy	  and	  India).	  
It	  is	  not	  illogical,	  of	  course,	  to	  argue	  that	  assessments 	  that	  deemed	  a	  design	  safe	  for	  the	  US	  might	  have	  
found	   it	   unsafe	   for	   Japan;	   especially	   considering	   Japan’s	   disIncIve	   seismic	   acIvity.	   Yet	   the	   US	  
manufacturer	  played	  a 	  leading	   role	  in	   the	   iniIal	   stages 	  of	   Fukushima’s	  approval,	  no	  doubt	  using	   the	  
same	   assumpIons	   and	   assessment	   models.	   The	   seismic	   variables	   would	   have	   diﬀered,	   but	   the	  
controversies	  that	  the	  accident	  highlighted	  about	   Japanese	  earthquake	  models	  echo	  ongoing	   debates	  
and	  uncertainIes	  in	  around	  US	   seismic	   standards	   (eg:	  McCann	   2011).	  There	  is 	  every	   reason,	  in	  other	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14	  It	  is	  worth	  noIng,	  moreover,	  that	  the	  events	  in	  Japan,	  although	  unusual,	  were	  far	  from	  unthinkable.	  The	  9.0	  earthquake	  was	  large,	  but	  not	  to	  
a	  degree	  that	  should	  have	  made	  it	  obviously	  beyond	  consideraIon.	  The	  area,	  at	  the	  intersecIon	  of	  three	  fault	  lines,	  was	  long	  expected	  to	  be	  
due	  a	  seismic	  event,	  and	  the	  quake,	  when	  it	  came,	  was	  only	  the	  fourth	  largest	  of	  the	  last	  century.	  Experts	  had	  repeatedly	  tried	  to	  highlight	  the	  
danger	  (Perrow	  2011b:	  47),	  yet,	  as	  the	  head	  of	  Kinki	  University's	  Atomic	  Energy	  Research	  InsItute	  told	  the	  Wall	  Street	  Journal:	  "The	  earthquake	  
and	  tsunami	  […]	  both	  exceeded	  [the	  accepted]	  engineering	  assumpIons	  by	  a	  long	  shot"	  (in	  Shirouzu	  &	  Smith	  2011).
15	  Indian	  Nuclear	  Commission	  online.	  [Accessed	  2010;	  since	  removed].
words,	  to	  imagine	  that	  Fukushima’s 	  assessment	  calculaIons	  would	  have	  been	  acceptable	  elsewhere.	  At	  
the	  Ime	  of	  the	  accident,	  we	  should	  remember,	  Japan	  had	  a	  ﬁrst-­‐class	  reputaIon	  for	  managing	  complex	  
engineering	   infrastructures.	  As	  the	  Itle	  of	   one	  op-­‐ed	  in	  the	  Washington	  Post	  put	  it,	  "If	   the	  competent	  
and	   technologically	   brilliant	   Japanese	   can't	   build	   a 	  completely	   safe	   reactor,	   who	   can?”	   (Applebaum	  
2011).
Claims	   that	   Fukushima	   is 	   excepIonal	   because	   assessment	   standards	   have	   changed	   are	   similarly	  
uncompelling.	  It	  is 	  certainly	  true	  that	  assessment	  pracIces	  have	  evolved,	  such	  that	  modern	  assessments	  
diﬀer	   signiﬁcantly	   from	  those	  that	  governed	  the	  Mark-­‐1,	  but	  it	  is 	  also	   true	  that	  successive	   regulatory	  
regimes	  had	  periodically	  reviewed	  and	  reassessed	  the	  Mark-­‐1	  reactors	  using	  updated	  calculaIve	  criteria,	  
and	   declared	   them	   to	   be	   safe.	   In	   this	   regard	   as	  well,	   therefore,	   the	   accident’s 	   relevance	   to	   wider	  
assessment	  pracIces	  is	  diﬃcult	  to	  dispute.	  
iii.	  Compliance	  reexamined
Claims	  of	  excepIonal	  malpracIce	  and	  error	  merit	  more	  serious	  consideraIon.	  Such	  arguments	  also	  have	  
a	  long	  history;	  error	  and	  malpracIce	  being	  common	  themes 	  of	  almost	  all	  accident	  invesIgaIons.16	  The	  
formal	  reports	  that	  idenIfy	  human	   failures	  at	  Fukushima	  echo	   those	  of	   previous	  disasters	  such	  as	  the	  
‘Kemeny	  Commission’	  invesIgaIon	  into	  Three	  Mile	  Island,	  which	  pointed	  to	  operator	  error	  as	  the	  cause.	  
Thereby	   establishing	   a	   longstanding	   caricature	   of	   TMI	   as,	   in	   Socolow’s	   (2011)	   words,	   the	   result	   of	  
“appalling	   deﬁciencies	  in	  worker	   training"	   (see	  also:	  Wynne	  1983:	  23;	  Otway	  &	  Misenta	  1980).	  Soviet	  
invesIgaIons	   into	   Chernobyl,	  meanwhile,	  similarly	   idenIﬁed	  human	  error	   as	  the	  primary	   cause,	  with	  
the	  plant	  director	  and	  ﬁve	  other	  operators	  being	  sentenced	  to	  long	  prison	  terms	  (Schmid	  2011:	  20).	  
It	  is 	  debatable	   in	  both	  cases	  whether	   the	  speciﬁc	  charges	  were	  wholly	  warranted,	  as	  we	  will	   see	  in	  a	  
later	   secIon	   below,	   yet	   errors	   and	   malfeasance	   undeniably	   do	   contribute	   to	   accidents 	   in	   complex	  
organizaIons	  and	  there	  is 	  compelling	  evidence	  that	  they	  contributed,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  the	  Fukushima	  
disaster.	  
Even	  if	  we	  can	  blame	  a	  nuclear	  accident	  on	  errors	  or	  misbehavior,	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
redeem	  the	  assessments	  that	   claimed	  the	  accident	  was 	  not	  credible.	  This	  is 	  because	  such	  redempIon	  
would	  imply	  that	  perfect	  assessments	  of	  (and	  control	  over)	  nuclear	  risks	  are	  possible	  if	  everyone	  acted	  
raIonally	  and	  followed	  the	  rules,	   and,	  further,	  it	  would	   imply	   that	   it	   is	  reasonable	  for	   assessments 	  to	  
expect	  everyone	  to	  act	  raIonally	  and	  follow	  the	  rules.	  Both	  of	  these	  premises	  are	  implausible.	  
Take,	  ﬁrst,	   the	  idea	  is 	  that	   it	   is	  realisIc	   for	  assessments	  to	  assume	  that	   people	  will	  always	  follow	   the	  
rules.	   Accounts	  of	   Fukushima,	   like	   those	  of	   Chernobyl	  and	   TMI,	   invariably	   treat	   its 	  apparent	  human	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16	  Many	  scholars	  aSribute	  the	  emphasis	  on	  human	  error	  in	  the	  discourse	  around	  accidents	  as	  much	  to	  insItuIonal	  expediency	  as	  to	  human	  
deﬁciency.	  Perrow	  (1983;	  1999),	  for	  instance,	  argues	  that	  insItuIons	  try	  to	  limit	  their	  liability	  for	  accidents	  by	  leveraging	  ambiguiIes	  in	  the	  
deﬁniIon	  of	  ‘operator	  error’.
failings	  as	  aberrant,	  but	  the	  kinds 	  of	  misbehavior	  they	  document	  are	  arguably	  quite	  unexcepIonal.	  Over	  
the	   last	  thirty	  years	  a	  large	  and	  sophisIcated	  body	  of	  academic	   literature	  has	  emerged	  exploring	  how	  
human-­‐error,	  noncompliance	  and	  malfeasance	  relate	  to	  accidents.	  Vaughan	  (1996),	  for	  instance,	  speaks	  
of	  the	  “normalizaIon	  of	  deviance”;	  Rasmussen	  (1997)	  of	  “migraIon	  to	  the	  boundary”;	  and	  Snook	  (2000)	  
of	  "pracIcal	  drin."	  This 	  discourse	  –	  of	  which	  Silbey	  (2009)	  oﬀers	  a 	  useful	  overview	  –	  someImes	  conveys	  
a	  diﬀuse	  impression,	  onen	   implicit	  and	  unintenIonal,	  that	  human	  behavior	  is	  a	  manageable	  problem:	  
“something	  akin	  to	  noise	  in	  the	  system”	  as	  Silbey	  (2009:	  342)	  puts 	  it.	  Yet	  it	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  has	  proven	  
stubbornly	  resilient	  to	  sociologists’	  proscripIons.	  As	  Wynne	  (1983:	  23)	  notes,	  “There	  are	  countless	  cases	  
where	   technologies	   have	   failed	   […]	   because	   somewhere	   in	   the	   social	   labyrinth	   of	   their	   enactment,	  
people	   have	   not	   acted	   according	   to	   the	   designers’	   unrealisIc	   assumpIons	  and	   faiths.”	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  
diﬃcult	   to	   imagine	   any	   insItuIon	   in	   history	   in	   which	   every	   rule	  was	  followed	   all	   the	   Ime.17	   In	   the	  
nuclear	  industry	  alone,	  for	  instance,	  there	  exists	  an	  extensive	  literature	  documenIng	  regulatory	  failings	  
in	  rouIne	  operaIons	  (see	  eg:	  Perrow	  2007;	  Perin	  2005).	  To	  a	  seasoned	  observer,	  therefore,	  it	  should	  be	  
enIrely	   unsurprising	   that	   the	   media	   spotlight	   generated	   by	   Fukushima	   unearthed	   evidence	   of	  
malpracIce	   in	   nuclear	   plants	   around	   the	  world	   (eg:	   Donn	  2011).18 	   The	  simple,	  resilient	   truth	   is	   that	  
people	   someImes	   disobey	   rules,	   and	   when	   nuclear	   risk	   assessments	   fail 	   to	   capture	   this	   in	   their	  
calculaIons	  then	  it	  is	  their	  own	  failing,	  akin	  to	  miscalculaIng	  the	  frequency	  of	  earthquakes.
Let	   us	  now	   consider	   the	  more	   intuiIve,	  premise	   implied	  by	   the	   ‘compliance	   defense’:	   that	   perfectly	  
compliant	  operators 	  (if	   they	  existed,	  contrary	   to	  my	  argument	  above)	  could,	   in	  principle,	  always 	  follow	  
the	  rules.	  This	  idea	  seems	  unproblemaIc,	  yet	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  literature	  suggests	  it	  is 	  unrealisIc.	  This	  
is 	   because	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘perfect	   rule	   compliance’	   implies 	   ‘perfect	   rules’	   –	   the	   idea	   that	   complex	  
insItuIons	  can	  realisIcally	  oﬀer	  unambiguous	  proscripIons	  for	  every	  conIngency	  –	  whereas 	  successive	  
studies 	   suggest	   that	   even	   the	   most	   expansive	   sIpulaIons	   need	   interpretaIon	   and	   cannot	   relieve	  
workers	  of	  having	  to	  make	  some	  decisions	  in	  uncertain	  condiIons 	  (eg:	  Schmid	  2011;	  Mackenzie	  2003).	  
Close	   accounts	   of	   technological	   work	   rouInely	   ﬁnd	   that	   work	   to	   be	   necessarily	   and	   unavoidably	  
‘messier’	  in	  pracIce	  than	  it	  appears	  on	  paper	  (eg:	  Langewiesche	  1998;	  Downer	  2007;	  Wynne	  1988),	  with	  
the	  eﬀect	  that	  ‘error’	  and	  ‘non-­‐compliance’	  are	  onen	  ambiguous	  concepts,	  which,	  like	  ‘failure,’	  are	  open	  
to	  legiImate	  interpretaIon.	  “RegulaIons	  will 	  always	  be	  imperfect,”	  as	  Perrow	  (2011b:	  46)	  puts 	  it,	  “they	  
cannot	   cover	   every	   exigency.”	   Wynne,	   for	   example,	   speaks	   of	   TMI	   in	   terms	   of	   “...an	   unresolvable	  
contradicIon	  between	  the	  demands	  of	   rouIne	  operaIon	  and	  occasional	  abnormal	  condiIons”	  (1983:	  
23-­‐7).	   He	   argues	   that	   the	   operators	   responded	   raIonally	   to	   the	   ambiguous	   rules 	   and	   informaIon	  
available	  to	  them.	  “To	  pretend	  that	  more	  competent	  operators 	  would	  have	  avoided	  the	  emergency,”	  he	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17	  ChrisIan	  tradiIon	  maintains	  that	  the	  very	  ﬁrst	  two	  humans	  on	  Earth	  disobeyed	  their	  only	  rule,	  commanded	  unto	  them	  by	  God	  Himself.
18	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note,	  moreover,	  that	  nuclear	  risk	  assessments	  cannot	  discount	  the	  possibility	  that	  someone	  will	  deliberately	  do	  
something	  self-­‐destrucIve	  and	  pathological.	  The	  nuclear	  industry	  recognizes	  this	  possibility.	  It	  studies	  ‘insider	  threats’	  and	  the	  resilience	  of	  
containment	  structures	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  errant	  airliners.	  But	  it	  fails	  to	  fully	  incorporate	  such	  factors	  into	  the	  assessments	  that	  frame	  policy	  and	  
public	  discourse.
writes,	   “is	   to	   imply	   that	   complete	   knowledge	   of	   the	   reactor	   system	   can	   exist	   and	   be	   exploited	   by	  
competent	  operators”	  –	  something	  he	  deems	  implausible	  (Wynne	  1983:	  23).	  
The	  vagaries	  of	   human	  performance	  and	   the	  ambiguiIes	  of	   rules	  are	  probably	  quite	  marginal	   to	  risk	  
calculaIons	  in	  most	  organizaIonal	  circumstances;	  which	  no	  doubt	  explains	  why	  there	  is 	  a 	  tradiIon	  of	  
neglecIng	   such	   issues	   in	   engineering	   assessments.	   At	   the	   levels	   of	   reliability	   expected	   of	   nuclear	  
reactors,	  however,	  –	  where	  meanImes-­‐between-­‐failure	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  thousands,	  if	  not	  hundreds-­‐
of-­‐thousands	  of	   years 	  –	   even	   highly	   unlikely	   compliance	   issues	  will	   unavoidably	   have	  a	  much	   larger	  
bearing	  on	  the	  validity	   of	   an	   assessment	   than	   they	  would	   in	  normal	  circumstances.	   In	  the	  context	  of	  
nuclear	   power,	  therefore,	  such	  issues 	  become	  enormously	   signiﬁcant.	  As	  I	  have	  elaborated	  elsewhere	  
(Downer	   2011b),	   engineers 	  need	  to	   quesIon	   their	   longstanding	   premises	  when	  operaIng	   with	  ultra-­‐
high	  reliabiliIes.
iv.	  Redemp)on	  reexamined.
Recognizing	   the	   irreducible	   vagaries	   of	   human	   behavior	   (and	   the	   rules	   governing	   it)	   oﬀers	  a 	  criIcal	  
perspecIve	   on	   the	  ﬁnal	   “we-­‐found-­‐and-­‐ﬁxed-­‐the-­‐error”	   redempIon	   narraIve.	   Not	   least,	   because	   it	  
shows	  that	  some	  shortcomings	  can	  never	  be	  corrected.	  
A	   principle	   shortcoming	   of	   the	   “found-­‐and-­‐ﬁxed”	   narraIve	   lies	   in	   its	   unrealisIc	   promise	   of	  
‘completeness’.	   Few	   criIcs 	  would	   argue	   that	   nuclear	   assessment	   pracIces 	   cannot	   be	   improved	   by	  
learning	  from	  past	  failures,	  or	  that	  improving	  them	  is	  not	  a	  worthwhile	  endeavor,19	  but	  ‘improved’	  is	  not	  
the	  same	  as	  ‘perfect’.	  The	  lessons	  of	  Fukushima	  will	  lead	  to	  beSer	  risk	  assessments,	  in	  other	  words,	  but	  
there	  is	  no	  way	  of	   knowing	  how	  much	  beSer.	  Even	  if	   experts	  can	  oﬀer	  compelling	   reasons	  to	  believe	  
that	   the	   errors	   revealed	   by	   the	   accident	   have	   been	   resolved,	   therefore,	   they	   can	   oﬀer	   no	  
incontroverIble	  reasons	  to	  for	  us	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  assessments	  are	  now	  error-­‐free.	  (A	   goal	  that	  this	  
paper	  has	  outlined	  several	  in-­‐principle	  reasons	  to	  believe	  is	  fundamentally	  unrealizable.)	  
Perhaps	  more	  purely	  than	  any	  of	   the	  other	  arguments	  outlined	  in	  this	  paper,	  therefore,	  the	  promise	  of	  
perfecIbility	  appeals 	  for	  us 	  to	  follow	  Charlie	  Brown	  in	  subordinaIng	  experience	  to	  hope.	  It	  invites	  us	  to	  
disregard	  the	  history	  of	  nuclear	  regulaIon,	  and	  imagine	  that	  this 	  Ime	  it	  will	  be	  diﬀerent.	  “The	  perfectly	  
safe	  reactor	  is	  always 	  just	  around	  the	  corner”	  says	  Gusterson	  (2011).	  We	  might	  say	  the	  same	  about	  the	  
perfectly	  accurate	  risk	  assessment.	  
Nuclear	  experts	  rouInely	  deﬂect	  quesIons	  about	  the	  accuracy	  of	  their	  risk	  assessments 	  by	  emphasizing	  
their	  use	  of	  error-­‐bars	  and	  generous	  margins,	  designed	  to	  safely	  accommodate	  calculaIve	  uncertainIes.	  
Such	  tools	  are	  misleading,	  however,	  as	  they	  are	  framed	  by	  fallible	  understandings	  of	  where,	  exactly,	  the	  
uncertainIes	  lie,	  and	  oﬀer	  liSle	  defense	  against	  challenges	  that	  come	  from	  ‘outside	  the	  box.’	  Appeals 	  to	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19	  Indeed,	  the	  history	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  like	  that	  of	  all	  complex	  systems	  (Perrow	  2011b:	  51-­‐2;	  Downer	  2012b;	  Petroski	  2008),	  is	  one	  of	  
conInuous	  learning	  from	  accidents	  and	  near	  accidents.
generous	  error	  margins 	  misconstrue	  the	  uncertainIes	  of	  nuclear	  risk	  assessments	  by	  assuming	  that	  any	  
errors	  will 	  be	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  their	  calculaIons.	  (Such	  that,	  for	  example,	  a	  failure	  probability	  esImated	  
to	  be	  one-­‐in-­‐ten-­‐million	  might,	  at	  worst,	  be	  one-­‐in-­‐nine-­‐million	  instead.)	  But	  accidents	  in	  criIcal	  systems	  
someImes	   happen	   for	   reasons 	   that	   nobody	   even	   anIcipated,	   rather	   than	   because	   engineers	  
miscalculated	  a 	  known	  variable	  (Downer	  2012b),	  and	  when	  this	  happens	  risk	  projecIons	  can	  be	  oﬀ	   by	  
orders	  of	   magnitude.	   Even	   assessments	  with	   the	  most	   generous	   error-­‐margins	   can	   be	  upturned	   by	  
‘unknown	   unknowns’:	   unrecognized	   events 	   and	   failure-­‐modes	   that	   exist	   enIrely	   outside	   the	  
calculaIons.	  Nuclear	  experts	  are	  hasIly	  rethinking	  their	  tsunami	  calculaIons	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Fukushima,	  
for	  instance,	  but	  who	  is	  to	  say	  that	  a	  freak	  tsunami	  will	  be	  the	  next	  under-­‐anIcipated	  event	  to	  challenge	  
a	  nuclear	  plant.	  The	  lead	  author	  of	   a	  2011	  NRC	  report	  on	  ﬂood	  preparedness	  (Perkins	  et	  al.	  2011),	  for	  
instance,	   has	   claimed	   that	   the	  Oconee	  plant	   in	   South	  Carolina	   is	   almost	  certain	   to	  melt-­‐down	   if	   the	  
upstream	   Jocassee	  dam	  were	  to	  fail,	   and,	  further,	   that	  such	  an	  event	   –	   at	  Oconee	  or	  elsewhere	  –	   is	  
hundreds	  of	  Imes	  more	  probable	  than	  the	  tsunami	  that	  hit	  Japan	  (Global	  Research	  2012).20	  
It	   is 	   not	   unreasonable,	   ﬁnally,	   to	   maintain	   that	   adequately	   (albeit	   not	   perfectly)	   accurate	   risk	  
assessments	  might	  be	  achievable	  if	  experts	  were	  to	  steadily	   learn	  from	  their	  failures.21	  For	  proponents	  
of	  this	  view,	  however,	  Fukushima	  sIll	  raises	  damming	  quesIons	  about	  the	  Imescales	  involved,	  and	  how	  
willing	  we	  are	  to	  tolerate	  the	  learning	  process.	  How	  many	  accidents	  would	  be	  required	  before	  we	  could	  
be	  conﬁdent	  that	  our	  assessments	  were	  accurate?	  “The	  Japanese	  radiaIon	  vicIms	  and	  the	  dead	  plant	  
workers	  will	  be	  glad	  to	  know	  that	  in	  their	  disaster	  lies	  our	  salvaIon”	  writes	  Perrow	  (2011a).	  He	  is	  being	  
arch,	  of	  course,	  but	  he	  has	  a	  point.	  Arguing	   that	  we	  should	  not	  reject	  nuclear	  risk	  assessments	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  a 	  few	  ‘teething	  problems’	  begs	  the	  quesIon	  of	  when	  disasters	  should	  truly	  be	  deﬁniIve.	  If	  the	  
Cold	   War	   had	   ended	   in	   a	   thermonuclear	   exchange,	   would	   the	   ensuing	   holocaust	   have	   invalidated	  
deterrence	  theory,	  or	  merely	  suggested	  it	  needed	  reﬁnement?	  
The	  only	  fact	  that	  Fukushima	  demonstrates	  absolutely	  unambiguously	  is 	  that	  devastaIng	  oversights	  can	  
exist	   in	   what	   authoritaIve	   experts	   ardently	   claim	   to	   be	   rigorous,	   objecIve	   and	   conservaIve	   risk	  
calculaIons.
4.	  CONCLUSION
The	  disaster-­‐punctuated	  history	  of	   nuclear	  power	  ought	  to	  speak	  for	  itself	  about	  the	  limitaIons	  of	  risk	  
assessments,	  but	  our	  narraIves	  obfuscate	  that	  history	  by	  raIonalizing	  it	  away.	  For	  experience	  can	  only	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20	  He	  has	  also	  formally	  alleged	  that	  the	  NRC	  censored	  his	  report	  by	  “…intenIonally	  mischaracteriz[ing]	  relevant	  and	  noteworthy	  safety	  
informaIon	  as	  sensiIve,	  security	  informaIon	  in	  an	  eﬀort	  to	  conceal	  the	  informaIon	  from	  the	  public.”	  (Global	  Research	  2012).
21	  The	  reliability	  of	  modern	  jet-­‐liners,	  for	  instance,	  is	  built	  on	  lessons	  gleaned	  from	  billions	  of	  ﬂights	  that	  have	  elicited	  thousands	  of	  accidents.	  
But	  this	  was	  only	  made	  possible	  by	  an	  extraordinarily	  high	  tolerance	  for	  risk	  in	  the	  early	  decades	  of	  aviaIon,	  (which	  would	  be	  unrealisIc	  in	  the	  
nuclear	  sphere),	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  what	  I	  call	  ‘InnovaIve	  restraint’	  (which	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  cannot	  match.)	  (Downer	  2011a,	  2011b).
‘show’	  if	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  ‘see,’	  and	  the	  lessons	  of	  Fukushima,	  like	  those	  of	  the	  accidents	  that	  preceded	  
it,	  will	  always	  be	  opaque	  to	  us	  if	  our	  narraIves	  consistently	  interpret	  it	  as	  excepIonal.	  So	  it	  is	  that	  even	  
as	   the	   dramas	   of	   Fukushima	  linger,	   and	   in	   some	  ways	  intensify,	   the	   Ideal	  of	   Mechanical	  ObjecIvity	  
survives	  with	  its 	  misleading	  impression	  that	  expert	  calculaIons	  can	  objecIvely	  and	  precisely	  reveal	  the	  
‘truth’	  of	  nuclear	  risks.	  This	  has	  criIcal	  policy	  implicaIons.
At	   a	   2012	  post-­‐Fukushima	  enquiry,	   Japan’s	   Trade	  Minister,	   Yukio	   Edano,	   tesIﬁed	   that	   the	   Japanese	  
nuclear	   regulator	   had	   rejected	   global	   standards	   for	   disaster	   response	  out	   of	   fear	   that	   implemenIng	  
them	  “would	  undermine	  public	  trust”	  (in	  Kubota	  2012).	  His 	  disclosure	   illustrates	  the	  truth	  of	   Power’s	  
(2011:	  29)	  observaIon	  that	  “a	  society	  which	  seems	  to	  manage	  risk	  via 	  the	  intensiﬁcaIon	  of	  audiIng	  and	  
monitoring,	   in	   fact	   makes	   itself	   more	   vulnerable	   by	   damaging	   the	   insItuIonal	   condiIons 	   for	  
encountering	  fundamental	  surprise.”22	  
Irreducible	  uncertainIes 	  exist	  in	  even	  the	  most	  rigorous	  calculaIons,	  and	  we	  need	  to	  recognize	  this.	  For	  
what	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  risk	  calculaIon	  of	  dubious	  reliability?	  It	  is	  not	  useful	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is 	  a	  one-­‐
in-­‐a-­‐million	  chance	  of	  a 	  meltdown,	  but	  an	  unknowable	   (but	  nevertheless 	  meaningful)	   chance	  that	  that	  
ﬁgure	  is	  completely	   wrong	   because	  it	  assumes	  an	  erroneous	  design	   basis	  or	  an	   implausible	  model	  of	  
human	   behavior.	   Such	   a	   claim	   oﬀers	   no	   compelling	   reason	   for	   policymakers	   to	   defer	   to	   expert	  
assurances	  that	  nuclear	   accidents 	  will	  not	  happen;	  no	   jusIﬁcaIon	   for	   them	  to	   avoid	  considering	   the	  
possibility	   of	   accidents	   when	   evaluaIng	   the	   costs	   and	   beneﬁts 	  of	   proposed	   nuclear	   plants;	   and	   no	  
grounds	   for	   shirking	   the	   high	   costs	   of	   disaster	   preparaIon.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   reintroduces	   all 	   the	  
problems	  that	  nuclear	  regulators	  tried	  to	  escape	  from	  with	  their	  iniIal	  turn	  to	  probabilism	  in	  the	  1960s.
The	  pervasive	  idealizaIon	  of	   formal	  risk	  assessments,	  which	  so	  many	  narraIves	  of	  Fukushima	  reaﬃrm,	  
both	   narrows 	  the	  democraIc	  discussions	  around	  nuclear	   power,	   and	  perverts	  the	  processes	  through	  
which	  it	   is	  governed.	  The	  false	  surety	  it	  projects	  allows	  the	  cost/beneﬁt	  projecIons	  that	  frame	  nuclear	  
decisionmaking	   to	   silently	   discount	   the	   evidence	   of	   past	   accidents	   in	   the	   tacit	   understanding	   that	  
disasters	  are	  somehow	  aberrant	  and	  avoidable	  rather	  than	  endemic.	  The	  result,	  as	  outlined	  above,	  being	  
a	  deep-­‐rooted	  insItuIonal	  reluctance	  to	  adequately	  plan	  for	  worst-­‐case	  scenarios,	  and	  an	  insItuIonal	  
inability	   to	   consider	  whether,	  as	  Perrow	   (2011b:	   52)	   succinctly	   puts	   it:	   “some	  complex	   systems	  with	  
catastrophic	  potenIal	  are	  just	  too	  dangerous	  to	  exist,	  not	  because	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  make	  them	  safe,	  
but	  because,	  as	  so	  much	  experience	  has	  shown,	  we	  simply	  cannot.”	  
We	  would	   be	   beSer	   posiIoned	   to	   govern	   the	   atomic	   age	   if	   we	   could	   insItuIonalize	   the	   idea	  that	  
nuclear	  risk	  assessments	  are	  contestable	  judgments	  more	  than	  they	  are	  objec've	  truths.	  Academic	  and	  
policy	   debates 	   that	   treat	   nuclear	   risk	   assessments	   as 	   ‘established	   facts’	   are	   likely	   to	   come	   to	   very	  
diﬀerent	  conclusions	  than	  those	  that	  are	  willing	  to	  grasp	  the	  neSle	  of	  uncertainty.	  Uncertainty	  demands	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22	  The	  idealized	  noIon	  of	  risk	  assessment	  does	  not	  even	  need	  to	  convince	  in	  order	  to	  constrain,	  as	  it	  shapes	  the	  insItuIonal	  structures	  that	  
even	  skepIcs	  must	  work	  within.	  Bureaucracies	  inevitably	  limit	  their	  scope	  of	  acIon	  when	  they	  formally	  and	  authoritaIvely	  ‘deny’	  technological	  
hazards,	  for	  it	  is	  diﬃcult	  –	  legally,	  bureaucraIcally	  and	  rhetorically	  –	  for	  policymakers	  to	  jusIfy,	  or	  regulators	  to	  require,	  the	  consideraIon	  of	  
risks	  that	  have	  been	  oﬃcially	  declared	  to	  be	  negligible.	  
‘possibilist’	  thinking	  (Clarke	  2005).	  It	  favors	  the	  ‘precauIonary	  principle’	  Collingridge	  &	  Reeve	  1986).23	  It	  
might	  not	  aid	  us 	  in	  making	  nuclear	  power	  safer,	  but	   it	  would	  more	  adequately	  frame	  the	  quesIon	  of	  
whether	  the	  costs	  of	   trying	  are	  too	  high	  to	  bear.	  A	  quesIon	  that	  must	  have	  weighed	  heavily	  on	  Japan’s	  
prime	  minister	  in	  2011,	  as	  he	  grappled	  with	  the	  grim	  calculus	  of	  catastrophe,	  and	  –	  harboring,	  he	  would	  
later	  confess,	  “apocalypIc	  visions	  of	  a 	  deserted	  Tokyo”	  (in	  Osnos	  2011:	  50)	  –	  ordered	  the	  formaIon	  of	  
‘suicide	  squads’	  to	  combat	  the	  unfolding	  disaster.	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